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INTRODUCTION
In this treatise we attempt to examine critically and develop sys-
tematically Sartre* s theory of consciousness as it appears principally in
his major philosophical work. Being and Nothingness
. We do not intend to
cover the entire scope of Sartre *s existential thought. Our primary inter-
est is focused on the interpretation of his theory of consciousness as
developed in his phenomenological ontology. More particularly, we will
show that Sartre* s aim in his Being and Nothingness is to describe, by
means of a phenomenological approach, the failure of the "Being-for-itself"
(human consciousness) in its relentless attempt to identify itself with
"Being-in-itself" (reality ocher than human consciousness; the "massive"
and "full" being as Sartre calls it).
All theories of consciousness are at least to some extent speculative
and hence must confront the challenge of that formidable foe which is none
other than the challenge of analytical philosophy. And since, in contem—
porary philosophy, the schism between analytical and existential philoso-
phies appears almost irreparable it is imperative that all philosophers who
concern themselves with existential thought meet this challenge rather than
simply dismiss it as mere "unimportant nonsense" (to borrow one of
Wittgenstein* s favorite expressions). To this end, then, we commence our
treatise by confronting this challenge. In the first part of this paper we
provide a brief discussion of the limitations of analytical philosophy
which render it inadequate to provide a careful and detailed description
of the human consciousness. And moreover, it appears to us that the metho-
2dological limitations and the restricted and fragmentary manner of philoso-
phizing, which is characteristic of analytical philosophy, prevent it from
accommodating an adequate theory of consciousness#
Phenomenology, in contrast to analytical philosophy, is geared toward
the investigation of consciousness. Indeed, phenomenology is a discipline
whose primary concern is to provide a description of the human consciousness
and the objects of consciousness as they appear to consciousness. Phenomeno-
logy, therefore, seems to be a particularly appropriate method for the formu-
lation of a theory of consciousness. And since Sartre sought to resolve
the problem of consciousness from a phenomenological basis we provide an
adumbrative exposition on the phenomenological method in the latter section
of the first part.
For a clear understanding of Sartre* s phenomenological ontology it is
imperative to recognize the influence of two phenomenologists, namely,
Husserl and Heidegger, on Sartre. The theories of these two philosophers
form the basis of Sartre* s phenomenological ontology. Our second part is,
therefore, devoted to the explication of some of the theories of these
philosophers that are particularly relevant to Sartre *s phenomenological
ontology and his theory of consciousness.
In the third part our main purpose is to develop systematically Sartre *s
phenomenological description of the two regions of Being: "Being-for-itself"
and "Being-in-itself ," their characteristics, their relations, their inter-
actions and their activities. Through detailed discussions of Sartre*s
phenomenological approach, his initial postulates, his theories of negation
and Nothingness, his concept of "bad faith" and his characterizations of
3"Beine-for-itsalf" and "Boins-in-its.lf.« w. 8how s.*™. flrst> nathodl_
oally empties the "Being-for-ltself" of most of its being ! second, fill,
the "Belng-in-itself.. with being, and. third, thus creates an hiatus be.
tween the two regions of Being, only to demonstrate that a synthesis
between the two regions of Being is unattainable. In the last section of
this part we recapitulate the main points of the previous seetioe to sub-
stantiate our conclusion that for Sartre the unification of the two regions
of Being into a synthetic whole is an impossibility.
ai the final part of this treatise we seek to show that Sartre* s initial
postulates upon which his entire system is based are unwarranted and unten-
able. Moreover, his "phenomenological method*’ cannot justifiably be des-
cribed as phenomenological, at least not in the strict Husserlian sense of
the term. Here we also challenge his characterization of the "Being-for-
itself’* as an empty and impersonal non-being. From our criticisms it would
appear that Sartre fails in his project to show the impossibility of a
synthesis between the two regions of Being. However, despite this apparent
failure, he makes a measurable contribution to the problem of Being, and
above all he succeeds in indicating the limitations of phenomenology in
resolving the problem of consciousness and the problem of Being.
PART I
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY
A
* limitations of Analytical Philosophy
The philosophical attitude prevalent in the English-speaking coun-
tries exhibits a profound distrust for all "Speculative philosophies"
that dominated the German thought in the nineteenth century. This dis-
trust soon resulted in an almost complete disregard for all speculative
systems, including its more recent mode, that of Sartrean "phenomenologi-
cal ontology." This skepticism is at least partially Justified by the
extravagances of German speculative thought, which indeed, in some
instances, is both obscure and incoherent. From this attitude, then.
emerged a new philosophical movement, commonly known as the analytical
movement
•
The group of philosophers known as the analytical philosophers, con-
trary to the popular impression, does not constitute a school. Although
they share the common belief that philosophy must be approached from a
scientific viewpoint, and indeed it is their claim that they have succeeded
where Kant had failed, namely, in finding a way "to set philosophy upon the
sure ptth of science," which is a dubious claim, they hold no distinctive
common thecis. Some have thought, erroneously, that the unifying thesis
can be found in the verifiability theory of meaning. But this theory,
although of prime importance, has many different formulations, of which
not one is commonly agreed upon. Moreover, even the interests of these
philosophers are at variance? the earlier positivists were interested in
5the empirical verification of propositions which would, in turn, deter-
mine the meaningfulness of such sentences, whereas the later linguistic
analysts were primarily concerned with the study of language as the tool
of knowledge. The vast profusion of literature that has been published
in the past five decades, and the rapidity with which the movement
evolved render it impossible to provide a comprehensive and detailed
review of the entire analytical movement. However, it will be fruitful
here to critically evaluate a few theories of its major exponents that are
particularly relevant and to show their methodological limitations in pro-
viding a theory of consciousness.
It is generally recognized py students of philosophy that logical
positivism is the root from whioh later movements grew. Thus, an exposi-
tion on analytical philosophy will do well to begin with this movement
and attempt to fix on some of its central points. In this regard there
seem to be at least four major theses which are central to all positivists;
these are (1) logical atomism, more specifically, the theory that all
complex statements of fact are in fact compound statements which depend
for their truth on simple statements about sense experience, and, further-
more, these are independent statements which do not entail any other;
(2) the verifiability theory of meaning, which claims that a statement
means precisely that which would verify it in sense experience, or ’’the
meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification”; (3) the ana-
lytical character of a priori knowledge, i.e., that all necessary state-
ments unfold the contents of our ideas rather than report truths about
nature; (4) the emotive theory of value, i.e., that statements of value
6are neither true nor false, but expressions of attitude
.
1 Of these four
theses, the verifiability theory of meaning is the most important and
interesting for our purposes, for if this theory is true, then any
general speculative theory concerning the human consciousness would be,
ir: principle, impossible. This theory implies the assumption that every-
thing that could be said could be expressed in terms of elementary state-
ments, i.e., the theory of logical atomism. The theory on the character
°f* £. priori knowledge and the emotive theory of value are not particu-
larly relevant, since they do not have any important bearing on the
question of the possibility of a theory of consciousness. We shall thus
confine ourselves primarily to an investigation of the verifiability
theory of meaning, and any mention of the theory of logical atomism will
be purely incidental, in that it will serve only to implement our under-
standing of the verifiability principle.
The common exaltation of science and the aversion to metaphysics
have been of fundamental importance in shaping the course of investiga-
tion ventured by the logical positivists. Closely related to these atti-
tudes is their stress of sense experience as the terminus a_ quo and ad
quQPi of our thinking, and their deep suspicion of any talk of universals
or necessary connections outside the fields of logic and mathematics.
Their attitude of disdain for all noncognitive enterprises, suoh as the
formulation of universal value theories, which they believe, strictly
speaking, are not the concern of the philosopher, since his task is
limited to clearing up the theoretical puzzles about methods and meanings
left behind by the scientists, led them to brand these as emotive and.
7consequently, unworthy of serious attention. If this conception of
philosophy prevails, then the business of philosophy must be degraded to
that of a handmaiden of science. Philosophy thus regarded is indeed a
dreary and bleak matter. It would seem from this that all that is left
for the philosopher is a universe of sense contents. It is true, that no
positivist ever maintained this explicitly! however, it is nevertheless
tacitly implied in their claim that when a remark about what is not sen-
sible is ventured, this remark, although not false, is meaningless.
Implicit in this unverifiable claim is the argument that an assertion is
a statement of fact; and if we are clear as to what is asserted, we must
be able to recognize that experience or those experiences that will verify
this assertion. Thus, when making an assertion we must always refer to
the relevant experience, namely, sense experience* If this theory is
true, the implications that it entails are devastating to our present
project, for it would not only render any theory about the human con-
sciousness implausible, but it would prime facie rule it out as unthink-
able and meaningless. We must now inquire in what sense, if any, this
theory is true.
In attempting to make their investigations appear "scientific," the
positivists chose to restrict their discussions of meaning in such a manner
that they would not include any mention of the noetic process, for such a
process would clearly entail in it the problem of consciousness, which,
as it were, is not publicly verifiable, let alone conclusively verifiable.
From this it becomes obvious why the positivists designed the verifia-
bility principle to be an empirical test, which admits only sense
8experience as evidence, to determine the object meant. This resulted in
their emphasis on the sensory rather than the introspective or any other
mode of verification. Formulated in this restricted manner, this prin-
ciple has proved incapable of accommodating the vast profusion of facts,
which clearly is not limited to sense experience alone. Thus, there has
not been a single empiricist theory of meaning commonly aeoepted among the
positivists; instead, there has been a succession of theories, each sub-
sequent one benefiting from the errors of the preceding one. Our most
feasible approach, then, would appear to be to systematically analyze the
main phases in the development of the verifiability theory and to show
how each successive one fails to cover those experiences which are neces-
sary for the formulation of a theory of consciousness.
The first stage of the verifiability principle was formulated by
2
Wittgenstein in his Tractatus of 1922. Here he argued that ’’everything
that can be thought at all can be thought clearly, ”^and ’’everything that
can be said can be said clearly.”^ For Wittgenstein the criterion of mean-
ingful statements is their coincidence with facts, and this coincidence is
verified through these very facts of ”my world,” and what ”my world” con-
sists of is the realm of sensibly and instantaneously given atomic facts,
to which only I have access. Strictly speaIcing, \re cannot refer to this
”my world” as the field of consciousness or even as immediate experience,
for these would imply an ex periencing agent, and this is not permissible
in Wlttgensteinian language, since any reference to a "self” would be
vacuous talk, for there oould be no empirical verification that would
sustain this ’’self.”"*
9or two reasons this theory would clearly cripple any attempt to
establish a theory of consciousness. First, all communication with other
minds—which is presupposed in every theory of oonsciousness-would be
impossible, owing to the privacy of access to the atomic facts to which
all meaningful statements must, in the end, refer. And there is no reason
to suppose that objects are anything other than groups of atomic facts
which, because they are simple, are not subject to further analysis nor,
therefore, to definition or description. If the atomic facts are incapable
of definition or description, what could serve as the common denominators
through which communication is made possible? The objects themselves?
Indeed no, for these objects are merely aggregates of atomic facts, and
atomic facts are private and incommunicable. If communication with other
minds is impossible, then any theory that purports to generalize certain
characteristics about consciousness is no more than a string of meaning-
less words.
Secondly, this theory would remove any talk about other minds and
would relegate such conjecture to the category of vacuous talk. let us
take, for example, the sentence nPeter believes that there is a leprechaun
inside his watch.” Now for two reasons this sentence is meaningless in
-Vittgensteinian language. (1) In accordance with Wittgenstein »s exten-
tionalist logic, it was maintained that all compound propositions are truth
functions of the propositions they contained.^ But in our example the com-
pound sentence, ’’Peter believes that there is a leprechaun inside his
watch,” does not depend for its truth upon the truth of its subordinate
proposition, namely, "there is a leprechaun inside his watch.” Hence such
10
a sentence is not a proposition asserting a state of affairs. (2) Since
it is obviously the case that Peter'»s belief is not directly verifiable ,
this sentence makes no claim beyond the empirically verifiable one that
Peter uttered a sequence of sounds. In this regard all sentences that
purport to tell of the consciousness of other minds must be discarded as
•'unimportant nonsense.- 7 But when a positivist stands in a communicative
relation with another Subject, he is not merely apprehending a sequence
of perceptible sounds uttered by this Subject. He understands the meaning
of the sounds which are but the expression by means of which another auto-
nomous consciousness, with the capacity to organize, to construct, and so
on, manifests itself. And repudiating the postulation of another con-
sciousness like my own seems to be, at best, an arbitrary choice. There
are other weaknesses with this theory, but suffice here to say that such
a theory is incompatible with any and all theories of consciousness.
We have seen from the above discussion of his theory that Wittgenstein
bed remained unwaveringly faithful to two of Schlick»s original and funda-
mental theses: first, "that a factual proposition refers to empirical
O
fact alone," and second, "that this fact was always what its assertor would
regard as the best warrant for the truth of his assertion."0 These theses
were reverentially adhered to by the positivists through all their later
variations of the verifiability principle. 10
Kow we come to the second stage. Here those positivists who felt
Wittgenstein* s theory too cramping to be borne, sought to loosen the veri-
fication principle, but nevertheless they retained the important position
that that which a person refers to must in some sense be verified by that
nparticular person. Thus the theory has here acquired a new appearance
which centers around the phrase "what might be verified by me." And indeed
this revised version was able to cover many statements in its net of mean-
ingful statements that have been ostracized as verbal waste by Wittgenstein »s
rather extraordinary criterion of meaningfulness. But unfortunately even
in this new dressing the theory still obviates any hope for a meaningful
inspection of consciousness other than my own.
The third stage again attempted a more inclusive theory by extending
the range of the verifiable. A new qualification was added: in sum, it
stipulated that the net of meaningful statements in inclusive of all those
statements that might in principle verify. ^However, there is a draw-
back to this seemingly plausible theory, and that is, it demands the veri-
fication to be co/^clus^ye
. The covert assumption underlying this theory
is that ultimately meaning must make reference to ostensive definitions,
and nothing less will serve. And Schlick held that "the statement that
two experiences of different subjects not only occupy corresponding places
in a systematic order, but also resemble each other qualitatively, has for
us no sense. Note that it is not false, but senseless (sinnlos); we have
13
no idea what it means." Conjointly, these two theses, namely, meaning
must ultimately refer to ostensive definitions, and the equipollence of
experiences of different subjects, lead either to the elimination of all
statements about the experiences of other people, since such statements
cannot be ostensively sustained nor is the equipollence of experiences of
different subjects conclusively verifiable, or else to the reduction of
other people* s experience to one*s own, namely to redefine the experience
12
of other people in terns of their empirical manifestations-thet is. in
terns of the overt behavior of their bodies and ultimately in terns of my
sense contents. Strictly speaking of course, it is meaningless to speak
of experience of "other people" unless we define this experience in terms
of my sense contents*
bile positivists such as Ayer adhered closely to this form of dogmatic
behaviorism, others like Oamap and lemoel preferred the even more radical
form of "physicalism.”1^
In this peculiar brand of physicallsm it was maintained that whenever
a person makes a statement such as "I an angry," and we accept this state-
ment to be true, what we in effect accept are the physical manifestations
of the person* s body, i.e., his verbalizations, his clenching of his fist,
his facial contortions, and ultimately the changes in his neurones. What
is meant here is that there is not only a "logical equivalence" between the
"physical" and the "mental," but there is also an "identity of content"
between the two; and this process was known as the translation of the
"mental" into the "physical.
"
15What the physicalists have actually done
was to make a leap from the logical equivalence, which demands that both
the statement about consciousness and about the overt behavioral mani-
festations must be true or false simultaneously, to the claim of identity
of content. Resolving one content into the other in this manner is clearly
unacceptable, for "uniform accompaniment is not identity. "^This view was
soon abandoned by Carnap, who admitted with oandor the untenability of
this theory. He writes: "A person sometimes knows he is angry without
applying any of those procedures which another person would have to
13
apply ...»17„Anser is not the sa!Tie as tte novements by ^ioh an an(-ry
organism reacts to his environment ...”18It is, in short, an experience
and not a bodily reaction. later Carnap reformulated this theory into a
milder version? here he replaces ’’translatable*' by ’’reducible.” However,
the logical equivalence was still maintained, but now the observable
bodily reactions are referred to as ”symptoms”19(Carnap) or "test condi-
tions" (Ilempel) of anger, and we are to verify our judgments by these
alone. Although his modification was aimed at a compromise, it fell short
of its goal. For if "reducibility” implies that the mental assertion can
be reducible to the physical in meaning or content asserted, then we have
physical!sm all over again. And if it means that the mental assertion
refers to a state of consciousness, then it has succumbed to eonmon sense.
Let us now examine a few of the difficulties inherent in this theory.
(1) If the "physical symptoms” are parallel to the states of consciousness
of other people, then this uniform accompaniment must be observable. But
no state of consciousness belonging to another person is, in principle,
observable by another person. How, then, are we justified in drawing a
parallel? (2) In the present form this theory assumes that for every con-
scious event there is a physical correlate? however, even if this were
true, there is no way of maintaining it. The positivists allow for only
two kinds of statements, analytic and synthetic. But the above assertion
is not analytic, for the identity of the states of consciousness and the
physical manifestations is no longer maintained. Nor, for that matter, is
it a synthetic statement, for states of consciousness are not verifiable by
the other subjects. Thus the theory here is not only unestablished but
14
meaningless, moreover,
.ven if „ allow for the verification of conscious
events by other subjects, this verification can never be exhaustive and,
consequently, never conclusive.
Let us here recapitulate some of the min points of this view and
assess its plausibility in providing an adequate theory of consciousness.
W® haVC S6em how the first v^sion of Carnap* s physicalism is inaeeeptable,
as was later recognized by Carnap himself. Yet the modified version,
which could be an intelligible and natural view as urged by the positi-
vists. becomes rampant with contradictions and incoherences, for their
methodology does not permit such a theory. If we accept the physicalists
»
view that the consciousness of men, in its rich proliferations, is not. as
distinct from its physical manifestations, a true object of knowledge at
all. then any philosopher who choses not to speak of the consciousness in
physical terms must remain silent. The untenable consequences of physi-
calism would seem to suggest that we should search for a theory of con-
sciousness elsewhere.
The inadequacies of the third interpretation made it necessary to once
again reformulate the verifiability principle. According to the fourth
interpretation, a statement is meaningful if it might, in principle, be
verified by anyone at all. Yet according to Professor Schlick, the stipu-
lation that the verification must be conclusive must still be retained here.
Such is the emphasis on the conclusiveness of verification that we are per-
suaded to regard it as nothing less than a central doctrine for the posi-
tivists.
'dhen J speak of the consciousnesses of other people, how can I con-
15
clusively verify their existence? No finite number of instances will
enable me to have conclusive evidence that other people possess conscious-
ness, for this would necessitate nothing short of completing an infinite
series, and it is always conceivable that in the future a contrary in-
stance might appear.
It is evident that this theory, as urged by Schlick, must now be aban-
doned. As Professor Ayer pointed out very forcefully, no statement of
fact is conclusively verifiable. He further maintained that "if this is
correct, the principle that a sentence is factually significant only if it
expresses what is conclusively verifiable is self-stultifying as a cri-
terion of significance. For it leads to the conclusion that it is impos-
sible to make a statement of fact at all."^
In a fifth attempt the positivists were finally convinced that the
insistence on conclusiveness proved to be a liability rather than an
asset, and this demand was abandoned in Professor Ayer's new proposal in
the second edition of his Language Truth and Logic . Here he distin-
guished between strong, or conclusive, and weak verification. He writes;
"A proposition is said to be verified in the strong sense of the term if,
and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience.
Biit it is verifiable in the weak sense if it is possible for experience
to render it probable." fc"We say that the question must be asked about any
putative statement of fact is not. Would any observation make its truth
or falsehood logically certain?
but 8lmply
’
Would any observnUor’ ba rele-
vant to the determination of its truth or falsehood? And it is only if a
negative answer is given to this second question that we conclude that the
16
statement is considered nonsensical."23ThlB ls , olaar adTan(,e
over the previous attempts, for it readily admitted propositions about
other people's minds, since ve can at least claim that their ostensible
behavior is relevant in determining the truth or falsehood of these pro-
positions. Though regarding these propositions Professor Ayer continued
to hold, with less than apodeictic certainty, his behavioristic view. The
problem with this criterion was no longer its exclusion of meaningful
statements but its inclusion of statements as meaningful that are in fact,
by the fiat of common sense, meaningless.
In an article titled '’Meaninglessness" published in Kind, Ayer refor-
mulated this theory in more technical terms. He writes: "Let us call a
proposition which records an actual or possible observation an experien-
tial proposition. Then we may say that it is the mark of a genuine
factual proposition that some experlental propositions can be deduoed from
it in conjunction with certain other premises without being dedueible
from those other premises alone." But this new criterion, as Isaiah
Berline noted, would allow one to meaningfully say, "This logical problem
is bright green"; and with the aid of amother premise, "I dislike all shades
of green," one could deduce a verifiable conclusion not dedueible from
either premise alone, namely, "I dislike this logical problem, "~^which is
obviously a manifest absurdity. Indeed, some ten years later Ayer himself
recognized the untenability of this criterion and abandoned it. Clearly,
then, as a criterion for meaningfulness, this theory is unsatisfactory.
It would seem that the repeated necessity for readjustment and improvi-
zation and revision would have, with constraining evidence, indicated the
17
futility of pursuing this task of establishing an acceptable verifiability
principle. However, although this movement became relatively stagnant in
Britain, it took a new course in America. The emphasis now shifted from
de facto verification to language—a language free from the vestiges of
archaic metaphysics and obscurities
, in which the components would in-
clude only logical symbols and subjects and predicates that refer to observ-
able (sensible) things. Thus the criterion for meaningfulness now becomes
that of translatability into this empirical language. Insofar as the
logical constants and quantifiers are concerned, they bear no great im-
portance for us. And as for the phrase ’’observable predicates,” this
sieve proves equivocal if it admits such unobservables as other people*
s
consciousnesses, and it begs the question if it excludes them as mean-
ingless. Hence, many of our previous criticisms are applicable here, for
instance, reference to observable or sensible things as a criterion of
meaningfulness. Although this modification was meant to be a measurable
advance over previous attempts, it too proved implausible.
We have reviewed the main stages in the development of the verifia-
bility theory; to some we devoted brief attention, and others we dealt
with in considerable detail. From this we can safely say that through its
different variations a two-fold thesis was consistently and persistently
upheld. On the one hand the meaning of a statement is precisely that
which would secure its truth; and on the other hand, regarding facts, only
sense experience can bring certainty of truth. It is toward this dual
thesis that ultimately all forms converged. This dual thesis, if held,
would inevitably rule out any attempt that purports to theorize about
18
consciousness. This emphasis on meaning-inspection, hardly objectionable
in its right place, tends toward dogmatism when it oversteps its rightful
sphere. The range of empirical actualities is certainly not limited to
sense experience alone. And by reducing all empirical actualities to ny
personal cense contents, 1 invariably omit vast realms of nonperceptible
data such as all historical facts, psychological facts that constitute an
individual’ 3 psychic life, and everyday communication with others. If
philosophy neglects these perennial data which bear incommensurable con-
sequences to one’s life, then philosophy is but a form of intellectual
gymnastics. And in eliminating theories of consciousness, as did the
positivists, in what I believe to be an arbitrary manner, it subtracts
from itself that very margin of credibility.
Let us now turn to the later developments of analytical philosophy
known as linguistic philosophy, here those analytical philosophers who
were critical of the insurmountable difficulties brought about by the
positivistic approach sought a new course. From these philosophers emerged
the new idea: that the assumption in advance that what one means will fall
neatly into preconceived categories is unwarranted. A statement must speak
for itself; it nay have its own kind of meaning, and that kind of meaning
its own logic. The key to these varieties of weaning is language. Only
through the nuances of language can we explore the manifold content of
idea, impulse, and feeling that human beings can express. The rule here
is no longer that of searching for meaning but "look for the use .
”
The earlier forms of linguistic analysis are variegated and numerous.
However, we shall limit our discussion to three: the common sense theory
19
of Q. S. Moore (although, strictly speaking, his philosophy is not solely
linguistic analysis, Moore did pioneer the linguistic movement, and his
influence on the later forms of linguistic analysis is incommensurable); 26
N * lVjaloolm,s theory of common usage; and Ayer’s application of Russell’s
theory of "definite description" and his theory of "logical constructions."
In 1925 Professor Moore published what many analysts consider to be his
singularly most important work, "A Defense of Common Sense." In this
essay he suggested the efficacy of common sense and its language to provide
the genuine philosophical problems on the one hand, and the criterion to
determine the genuineness of speculative claims on the other. He further
held that even apparently trivial deviations from ordinary (standard)
language may result in the infiltration of pseudo-philosophical problems,
and that those philosophical statements that violate ordinary language are
false. Ihus, to resolve any theory of consciousness we must ultimately
make ordinary language our court of appeal. But precisely because ordi-
nary language and common sense, with their profusion of ambiguities,
vagaries, and lack of certainty do not even ask the question "Are there
other consciousnesses like mine?" let alone provide the sort of answer
the philosopher seeks, they are inadequate to serve as tools for the formu-
lation of a theory of consciousness. The main difficulty with Moore’s
proposal seems to be the extension of jurisdiction of common sense and
ordinary language into realms where their arbitrations are ineffective.
Professor Malcolm believed that Moore’s fundamental proposal was sound,
and that its difficulties could be remedied by stressing the importance of
language. According to Professor Malcolm, when philosophers depart from
20
common sense, what they are really doing is misusing words; he writes “the
philosophizing of the more important philosophers has consisted in their
more or less subtly repudiating ordinary language. "^However, he maintained
that under certain conditions, common sense, when using language correctly,
could not be mistaken. These conditions stipulated that any expression
employed should have (1) a descriptive and (2) an underivative use. 28Thus
regarded, "it is not possible for an ordinary form of speech to be im-
proper. That is to say, ordinary language is correct language, ,,2^and
cannot produce false statements. Here Professor Malcolm sees "correct
language to imply not only proper usage, but also truth , that is, being
correct is equivalent to being true. Thus to refute any philosophical
paradox, all one need do is to indicate where there has been a misuse of
language. The confusion here seems to be the confounding of the terms
"proper" and "true." Truth may be understood as that which corresponds
to a statement of fact; while propriety demands no more than the conformity
to an established usage. Proper usage does not, on the one hand, assure
inerrancy; nor, on the other hand, does improper usage imply falsehood.
Ordinary language has not reached the reflective level nor the sophisti-
cation capable of coping with philosophical problems such as that of con-
sciousness. And here any deviation from "proper" (ordinary) usage need
not necessarily result in falsehood.
Despite the problems encountered in both Moore* s and Malcolm* s theories,
Ayer persisted in adhering to the conviction that philosophy is intimately,
and Indeed inextricably, linked to language. For Ayer all meaningful
philosophical statements were dfinitions, and definition here means none
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other than
-definition in use." As Ayer explains, «w. define a symbol ^
—
by showinS how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be
translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the definiendnm
itself, nor any of its synonyms.
"
3
°And the theories which were instrumental
in bringing about this mode of translation, which Ayer acknowledged as the
main concern of philosophy, were Russell's theory of "definite descrip-
tions" and his theory of "logical constructions." Let us look briefly at
Russell's theory of "definite descriptions." Here Russell showed how we
might meaningfully use names without postulating the existence of the enti-
ties named. Russell himself proposed the example "The author of Waverlav."
The analysis of this complex descriptive name would be as follows: "Some-
one (or, more strictly, something) wrote Waverlev and nothing else wrote
^averigy;." And the statement "The author of Waverlev is not" could be
dealt with in a corresponding manner. "Either each thing failed to write
or two or more things wrote Waverlev. » Thus when Russell's
theory of "definite description" is applied, we can remove any expression
or word that purports to name any alleged entity or stand for a thing or
substance, whose being is in question, such as "the absolute," "nothing-
ness," and other metaphysical impostors.
In his theory of "logical constructions" Russell proposed the rule that
"Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred
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entities." This substitution is effected when a sentence referring to any
questionable inferred entity is replaced by an acceptable equivalent whose
reference is confined to what is empirical and indubitable. Thus the refer-
ence to any physical object would be substituted by a class of sensory data.
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Ayer, however, went beyond Russell 1„ hie applioation of the letter's
theories. Not only were material substanoes eliminated but all entitles
beyond the reach of our acquaintance, such as consciousness of other people,
were removed. In common language, because we use the phrase "other people"
as a grammatical subject to which we attach consciousness, we frequently
take consciousness to refer to some Intangible "thing" that exists in its
own right. And because, according to both Russell and Ayer, consciousness
of other people's minds does not and cannot refer to anything, it has out-
lived Its usefulness and must now retire Into the metaphysical menagerie.
Like Moore's and Malcolm's theories, this too must be abandoned, for none
of these theories can accommodate any theory of consciousness.
Row we turn to the later linguistic philosophers, generally known as
the Oxonian "ordinary language" philosophers. Our present discussion will
be confined to the exposition and criticism of one of the most respected
exponents of this group, namely, Professor Ryle.
According to Professor Ryle, ordinary language is riddled with confu-
sions which in turn produce perplexing philosophical problems. And reveal-
ing this sort of confusion is to shed light on the nature of the problems
and their solutions. This sort of confusion that language induces Ryle
terras "category mistakes, n which in sura amounts to making one category do
the work of another. A category mistake occurs when we misuse a "sentence
factor." A sentence factor is "any partial expression which can enter into
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sentences otherwise dissimilar." '"Thus in the sentence »I am the man who
wrote this papei;* *1,* *the man who, 1 *who wrote this paper,* *wrote this
paper* are all sentence factors ."-^Let us illustrate with an example:
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"time Wan in 4004 B.C." and "th. rain began at four o-clock." The aen-
tenoe factors
..tine" and "rain" seen to belong to the sane category, yet
if this were the ease then it is obvious that we are oonfusing ^jne and an
avent in tine, as tine itself oan never be an event in tine. In the nanner
in which Ryle chose to define sentence factor he would have to admit an
indefinite number of sentence factors and in turn an indefinite number of
categories, and this he did.
Our question here is whether this doctrine nullifies all theories of
consciousness; that is. do sentences that purport to speak of consciousness
entail a "category mistake" of the kind described by Ryle? Does the belief
that there are other consciousnesses similar to my own entail category
mistakes? Are we here misusing the sentence factor "consciousness"?
Clearly not! Ihen a speculative philosopher assures us that consciousness
is of a different "material" than. say. the objects of consciousness, or
that there is an Efeo which interprets, organizes, and unifies different
contents of consciousness, one wonders if he is making a "category mistake"
or if these problems could be resolved by simply admitting to such mistakes.
If a philosopher is clear and consistent in articulating his concept of
consciousness, the ultimate court of appeal would seem to be that of reason
rather than whether it entails any "category mistakes." Undeniably specious
linguistic resemblances have led to many purely intellectual puzzles, but
we must resolve these problems, not dissolve them. And whether the human
consciousness can be synthesized with the object of consciousness is, to
me at least, certainly a genuine and fascinating philosophical problem; and
if we approach such a problem methodically, systematically, consistently.
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and rationally, we can avoid confounding the use of terms which is not so
much the result of language as it is a consequence of confused reasoning.
The oewildering absurdities that are imposed on the philosopher appear
to be not so much a consequence of language but rather the result of un-
clear thought. Expressions and sentences by themselves are neither absurd
nor true or false. Only as interpreted are they true, false, or absurd.
If I say nobody came, and interpreted this to mean that nobody has that
sort of attribute that enables it to come and go. then undeniably this
expression is absurd. But the absurdity lies in the interpretation and
not in the expression itself. It is undeniable that we are often misled
by words in the ways Ryle has described, but the underlying source of con-
fusion is to be found in thought. The discussion of words is at best
prefatory and preparatory for the resolution of such confusions. Our
ultimate appeal must be to an analysis of thought, consciousness, and mind.
We have reviewed, the basic tenents of the logical positivists and the
earlier and later linguistic analysts. Their austere speculative asceti-
cism, their stern self-exactions, their requirement of rigor of statement,
their demand for olarity, and their insistence on fidelity to fact are
indeed admirable. However, it is very disconcerting to see the positivists,
on the one hand, restricting philosophy to meaning-inspection at the price
of total neglect of the more important and interesting philosophical
problems; and the linguistic analysts, on the other, limiting their investi-
gations to the sphere of language, again at the cost of forsaking the peren-
nial problems of philosophy. Not only are the interests of the analytical
philosophers not channeled in the direction of a study of consciousness,
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but their very methodology prevents them from theorizing about the human
consciousness
•
Logical positivism is guided by the desire to inspect the contents of
consciousness rather than consciousness itself. And its distaste for all
forms of speculative philosophy imposes on it the conviction that the
subjective aspect of consciousness is unworthy of serious attention. The
logical positivists are only interested in the objective elements of con-
sciousness, namely, the objects or, more accurately, the contents of con-
sciousness. Thus any speculation on the pure form of consciousness is
regarded as nothing more than verbal waste.
Any philosophy which purports to analyze nonperceptible actualities
must to that degree be speculative; this seems to be the unavoidable con-
sequence of a basic human limitation. But through austere rationalism we
need not be misled into obscure and incoherent speculations. However,
some philosophical problems, among them the problem of consciousness,
cannot be expressed in a clear-cut manner; nor is ordinary, everyday lan-
guage efficacious as a tool for the articulation of such problems. Hence
the philosopher must resort to a language which is often obscure; yet
however obscure his language, his method and his concepts need not be. We
must now examine another mode of philosophizing which would more readily
accommodate theories of consciousness. To this end we shall direct our
attention to phenomenology, specifically, phenomenology as Husserl under-
stood it to mean*
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— ^2P—Gabillt^ a Phenomenolop-j ca l
_Approach to the Problem of
Consciousness .
" Phenomenology” is often considered to be a profound and recondite
approach to philosophy and science, but the vagueness which accompanies
this term is not only misleading but empties it of meaning. There has
been no clear notion of the precise contributions of phenomenology
to philosophy; but only the general conception that any attempt to detach
philosophy from speculative constructionism and to limit investigation to
the data which are presented in consciousness—descriptive rather than
explicative—is phenomenological. This much, at least, is accurate. But
to take but one example, the popular impression that phenomenology is inex-
tricably tied up with existentialism and that these two terms can be used
indiscriminately is unwarranted. The reason for this misconception is per-
haps due to the fact that Sartre* s philosophy, which is both phenomenologioal
and existential, is frequently taken as representative of both the pheno-
menologists and the existentialists. This is, of course, inaccurate; for
philosophers like Heidegger and Ijarcel, who consider their approaches to
be phenomenological, would gladly be disassociated from the Sartrean line.
And others like Jean Kering and Dietrich von Hildegrand would not particu-
larly relish being called existentialists.'"
To trace the genesis of the term phenomenology we must, in the end,
make reference to Kant*s original distinction between the phenomenon or
appearance of reality in consciousness, and the noumenon
. the thing-in-
itself. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant proposed that scientific
knowledge concerns phenomena and not nouraena, and to this extent his
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critique can be considered a sort of phenomenology. This position further
stresses that what is known is phenomena, precisely because to know here
means to appear to consciousness in a particular way. We can think of a
thing-in-itself" or potmenon but not know it, the known aspect of a "thing
-
in-itself ,T is the £ufc.nor.icnop
, i.e., its appearance
. Phenomena are all that
we have to go by; but according to Hegel, who was the first philosopher to
designate his own philorophy as phenomenology, phenomena reveal all that is
to be revealed through the dialectical process of human thought, and here
is where Hegel deviated from Kant.
If we understand phenomenology to express merely a descriptive approach,
then to the extent that positivism is concerned with a descriptive mode
of philosophizing
,
its claim that only phenomena are given to the con-
sciousness, and that the sole business of the philosopher is to describe
the contents of consciousness, it is phenomenological. As Heidegger ex-
plained, the expression "descriptive phenomenology" is tautological, for
these two terms are inseparable. And from this, what Freud and the later
behaviorlsts proposed to do in psychology, namely, to confine themselves
to description and observation of human behavior, they too are to this
degree phenomenologists . But surely this is not the sole interest of the
phenomenologists . Their prime concern lies with the essences (the constant
elements in a coordinated series of the actual and possible manifestations
of appearance) which are revealed through phenomena as known through con-
sciousness. Implied here is the dual conviction that consciousness cannot
be known independently of reality, and its converse, that reality is not
knowable apart from consciousness. But in seeking to reveal the essence of
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phenomena described, phenomenology is not to be confused with some sort of
modified Kantian noumenology; the phenomenologists are not seeking for
something ‘’behind" the phenomenon. Throughout the history of philosophy
there has been a relentless quest for a consistent reconciliation between
the reality of which we are conscious and the consciousness we have of
reality. And the phenomenologists are no exception; they are united in
their belief that only phenomena are given, and that a reconciliation,
if it is possible, must be sought in phenomena, that is. our consciousness
of them. Hence, as Layer puts it. consciousness is for the phenomenolo-
gist "a kind of being which things exercise, the only kind of being directly
available to the investigator. Thus, ... consciousness is best expressed
by the Berman word Bewusstsein, which means the kind of being an object of
knowledge has in being known. "^However, not in the sense of an identifica-
tion of being and being-known, but rather the notion that revelation of
being can come about only through examination of its being-known.
An investigation of an act of consciousness will reveal that (1) acts
of consciousness are related to each other in a continuum, and (2) an act
of consciousness is never solely subjectively conditioned but must always
have an objective aspect to it, that is, it must always refer to some ob-
ject of consciousness. Because every act of consciousness is a complex com-
pounding of subjective and objective elements, its analysis must in turn
be a complex affair. But the phenomenologist is confident that this analy-
sis is possible, and moreover it will lead him to the very origin of pure
consciousness, free from all a priori prejudices, and will bring him to
an understanding of the only being which can have significance for him.
29
Thus an examination of the experienced world must begin with consciousness,
for it is only through consciousness that this world, as experienced, is
possible; consciousness becomes the very condition of our experience.
The "objective" essences, which the phenomenologist aims at discover-
ing, must be independent of any arbitrary meaning that a subject mAy feel
disposed to assign to them. The siteject cannot, as it were, "produce" the
objects; nor. on the other hand, are the objective essences conceived as
engendering the relationship which exists between essence and subject,
ihis relationship, which resides in the conscious act, is not derived from
it; it has an autonomy that renders it truly objective. 37Henoe this objec-
tive relationship maintains the equilibrium between the two elements, and
it can only be revealed by an investigation of pure consciousness. And the
essences, if they are to be found, must be sought in consciousness.
ihus phenomenology is not merely a discipline which takes consciousness
as its point of departure but revolves its whole investigation around con-
sciousness, attempting to unveil consciousness in its present form as the
very seat of all possible experience, and consequently all knowledge.
These general remarks will suffice for our present purpose. We do not
propose to here provide an all-inclusive exposition of phenomenology, which
would invariably lead us into indissoluble conflicts, for the phenomenolo-
gists by no means agree on many issues, and, moreover, their interests and
techniques differ. Our sole intent is to show the advantages of pheno-
menology to cope with the problem of consciousness, and how this discipline
is oriented so that it readily admits analyses of consciousness.
with a few criticisms of analytical philosophy and a few brief remarks
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on phenomenology, we now turn to the background wherein Sartre developed
his phenomenological ontology. The two men whose influences on Sartre
were conspicuously evident throughout Sartre’s Being and Nothingness are
Husserl, commonly considered to be the founder of the phenomenological
method in its present form, and Heidegger, who was for many years an
assistant to Husserl at Freiburg. We shall next consider some relevant
thoughts of each of these men in turn, emphasizing the points of congruence
and divergence between these philosophers and Sartre. Our concern will be
confined to those theories that have influenced Sartre’s method and his
analysis of consciousness, and hopefully our discussion of those theories
will implement our understanding of Sartre. We do not pretend this stridy
to be exhaustive, even of those theories here considered.
part II
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF SARTRE
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A. Husserl and the Theory of Intentionally
Phenomenology for Husserl is both a method and a philosophy. It is a
method in that it outlines the steps and provides the techniques to reveal
the pure phenomenon, wherein the essence of appearances and that which
appears are to be found; it is a philosophy in that it purports to give nee
essary and essential knowledge of that which is. free from all contingent
factors. Phenomenology seeks to return to "things" as they are described
in terms of the consciousness wherein they are experienced. Such experi-
ence is distinguishable from other experiences, for the essence of each
experience is clearly recognizable as different from essences of other
experiences.
In his search for a science of essences, or an essential science,
Husserl consistently adhered to his convictions that the task of philoso-
phy is none other than an investigation of the very meaning (essence) of
being, and that this investigation must, in its own right, be just as
scientific as mathematics. According to Husserl, this science is possible
only through the application of the phenomenological method, wherein
"things" are freed of all elements of contingency. Thus Husserl* s philos-
ophy can be regarded as an elaboration of the method through which we can
arrive at the essential knowledge of things, or through which we can dis-
cover the what of the things that are . Such a science cannot be a system ,
for each "thing" must be examined separately in order to determine its
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essence. There cannot be one underlying prineiole to which all essences
of things conform, but this is not to say that the approach and method
cannot be s^stemat^q
. And in this resoect. unity, if it exists, must be
foxjnd "in the unity of a well-built edifice, wherein one solid stone is
placed on another,” and each stone represents an essence which is necessary
and eternally true.
Phenomenology as a study of consciousness must ultimately examine each
act of consciousness as a "pure” act of consciousness, seeking to discover
in each its essence, vrom this approach Husserl arrived at the conclusion
that consciousness must always be consciousness of (something), that is
"the essence of the Cartesian co^ito contained the co?itatum as immediately
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as the coglto itself.” Thus an act of consciousness is inextricably linked
to its object, they are but the subjective and the objective aspects of the
same thing. Hence, to know an act of consciousness essentially is to know
its object; and this knowledge of the object is absolute in the sense that
it is free from all vestiges of contingency, including that of existence.
Object here is not limited to things, but includes persons, thought, events,
categories, states of affairs, mental constructs such as numbers, and
others. And each of these objects has an essence which "can be *seen*
immediately in an adequate view of the act of consciousness wherein it is
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contained.” However, mental constructs, specifically those of mathematics
and logic, are purely the products of consciousness; they are static and
changeless and thus are independent of the conditions of the stream of
progressive experience which other objects as objects are subjected to.
Thus the flux of experience renders it impossible to describe essences,
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with the exception of those of logic and mathematics, to any degree of
exactitude, for by such a description we would immobilize the flow of con-
sciousness. Essences
, again with the exception of those of logic and mathe-
matics, if they are described exactly, become static. And since, as
kusserl admitted, we must allow a certain latitude in the conception of
what essences are, the description of these need not be exact.
For nusserl, to grasp the essence of something is to grasp its meaning.
In this regard essence and ’’sense” are identical, and since sense, or the
signification of things, is not to be found in a contingent world of things
existing independently of consciousness, it follows that we must seek
essenoes of things in consciousness itself. But to speak of essence is to
speak of that which is absolutely necessary, and since Kusserl defines the
necessary as that which has been purified of all contingency, then a science
of essence is nothing more than this purification which can be accomplished
only in consciousness; and this is the precise reason why Husserl confines
his investigation to consciousness and attempts to purify consciousness.
In his attempt to accomplish this purification of the consciousness,
Husserl developed his singularly most important concept, the concept of
intentionality. In his analysis of meanings Husserl concluded that to mean
is to intend (meinen ) . and thus a meaning (meinung ) is an intention of the
mind. And intentionality refers to both the relationship between mind and
some extra-mental reality and the objective term of the mind’s operation in
this reality, wherein is found the very essence of being itself. Thus
essence, sense, and meaning, which are to be found in consciousness, are
nothing but intentions, and these are joined through the common bond of
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intentional!ty. The vorld of consciousness becomes the world of intentions.
But intentions as mere intentions are empty-only when this intention is
Justified, is it fulfilled. To fulfill an Intention requires more than
the meaning which the mind assigns in thinldng-it requires an experience
of that which the mind signifies in thought. A genuine intention must
signify some characteristic of the actual state of affairs i that is. it
must have some objective reference, and this is the Justification it needs
to b© a full Intention rather than an empty intention.
In his pursuit of the essence of consciousness Husserl came to the
conclusion that consciousness is always in the form of "consciousnese-of"
something
; that is, consciousness must always be oriented towards an ob-
ject, and this orientation is its very intentional!ty, which is to be found
in an analysis of consciousness itself. Thus all acts of consciousness
must entail both subjectivity and objectivity. And true reflection is
inseparable from the object of reflection, for reflection is but an erlebnis
(vital experience) of the latter, and, similarly, to reflect on one f s own
consciousness is to have an erlebnis of it. From this, to be aware of
one*s own consciousness as objectively orievted is to have an "intentional
erlebnis ."
When Husserl characterized his philosophy as a "science of essences,"
two theses are implied: first, the objects of this science are independent
of mental construction; and secondly, the essences known are independent
of their correspondence to reality outside the consciousness. Thus we can
arrive at the essences only after we have purified both the consciousness
and the objects of consciousness of all accidental and contingent elements.
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consequently, Husserl developed the techniques necessary to assure pure
phenomenality of all objects of investigation. His first and more funda-
mental technique aimed at removing all factual roots of objects of investi-
gation. for according to Husserl, existence is contingent and is a prime
source of doubt. This technique he calls the epoohe . and it aims at the
radical and universal elimination of all positions that commit one to any
position regarding factual existence. By this Husserl did not intend to
eliminate existence itself but merely to remain noncommittal, to leave
this question out of consideration, and simply not enter into the question
of what things are. "Existence,” or as Husserl frequently called it,
"transcendence, is simply bracketed (*put in parentheses*) in the sense that
in its regard no position is taken either for or against—it may be that
things exist outside oonsoiousness
,
but since this existence can have no
significance whatever with regard to the essence of things, it is simply
left out of consideration. "^The epoohe is conceived as that which elimi-
nates the contingent question of existence and, in turn, eliminates the
doubt it entails. Throughout the phenomenological journey this question
cannot be reintroduced
,
lest doubt should be reintroduced, thus bringing
back the impure elements that are not necessary and, therefore, not essen-
tial. This technique is, of course, a negative device which serves as a
filter. But the epoohe must have a positive counterpart which will pene-
trate into the essential residue, thus gradually revealing the pure sub-
jectivity as the exclusive source of all objectivity. And this is to be
found in the various levels of reduction.
There are, according to Lauer, six recognizable levels of reduction to
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be found in Husserl* s writings, and each reduction brings a greater purity
of the subject. Furthermore, only when subjectivity is at its purest can
it be the universal a priori source of objectivity.
The first stage of reduction, psychological reduction, aims at idealiz-
ing the phenomenon of consciousness in that it seeks to disengage the
essence of consciousness from all its factual concretization and thus to
"escape the relativism inherent in the multiplicity of contingent subjects
.
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The second reduction, eidetic reduction, seeks to idealize objectivity
while purifying subjectivity. Here the essence of consciousness is seen
to be consciousness-of something. If the first reduction is regarded as
the purification of the cogito
. then the second reduction can be viewed as
the purification of the cogitatum .
The remaining reductions seem less clear, for they are not so much
distinct stages within a reductive process but rather concomitant factors
within a framework of purification. The first of these can be referred to
as the "phenomenological reduction." Here we must conceive awareness as
that which in no way objectifies that of which it is an awareness, that is,
to regard a subject which is in no sense of the word objectified , hence a
"pure" subject. Lauer explicates this rather difficult notion in the
following manner: "We might understand it as a way of grasping objects:
in every intentional act an object is that of which consciousness is con-
sciousness. There can, then, be no consciousness-of a pure subject; that
would be to objectify it and thus make it cease to be *pure.* Still,
* object* is an essentially relative term; there can be no object which is
not object for a subject. Hence, if an object is genuinely given as object,
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it is given as object for a subject, and thus the subject, too, is given;
it is a datum of consciousness. Just as there is no consciousness (act of
consciousness) without its objective reference, so there can be no object
without its subjective reference. So long as the term of this reference
is not objectified, it is *pure subject.'"44"]* then, there is a subject
which is in no way an objeot, it is a subject of which we cannot be con-
scious in the strict sense of the term, since the very preposition 'of*
would indicate in it an objective relationship. And still we must say of
this subject that it is known; in fact, it is the first absolute certitude.
It is known and it is known In consciousness, but it is not known as that
£f which one is conscious; it is simply known as that which is conscious,
which is to say, as the subjective term of the act of consciousness,
corresponding to the pure grammatical subject of the cogito. If the sub-
ject is at all conscious of being conscious it is conscious of itself as
Jut
subject." But this subject can be regarded as an object of reflection,
and in so doing we arrive at the knowledge of its essence—and this is pure
subjectivity. But this is possible only through a further reduction, that
is, if we universalize the subject attained through the phenomenological
reduction by objectifying it. From this it is clear that by a further
reduction we can arrive at a pure transcendental ego, wherein an identifi-
cation of essential knowledge and objective knowledge can be attained.
From this identification it follows that to know the transcendental ego is
to know objectivity. Then the transcendental ego must be the a priori
source of all objectivity.
It would seem that with the transcendental ego we would have arrived at
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the fin.1 term whereby no further reduction is possible. But according to
Husserl, the successive flow of experiences does not allow this subject to
remain static, for to become static is to cease to be subjectivity. Thus
there is a final reduction which terminates in the last term, namely, a
"pure flow of consciousness." which realises the temporality of oonsoious-
ness.
lmPleraent th® reductions in assuring the penetration of the residue
Ci pnen°mena left after the ff£.PPhe to their very essence, Husserl developed
the technique called ideation. This technique consists in submitting the
original perception or imagination to a series of ’’free” variation, wherein
the object is viewed from various aspects. And after a few aspects the con-
stant element will be "seen,” and this is precisely the essence of the ob-
jeot. We need not labor through the infinite variety of possible and actual
aspects—a few aspects suffice to bring out the essence. This technique
has the advantage in securing the objective validity of the knowledge
resulting from the process. But what is necessary for one subject need not
have universal validity. Thus Kusserl develops a fourth technique, that
of essential intuition. Here the essence of things, events, processes,
intuitions, are simply "seen." But for this intuition to be definitive, it
is not sufficient that one subject "sees" the essence involved. Husserl
asserts that all subjects must "see" it in a similar way if they are rea-
sonable.
We have indicated some main features of Husserl's methodology, his goal,
his theory of intentional!ty, and his basic phenomenological techniques, and
we are now prepared to examine some of Heidegger's theories.
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B. Helde^er and Hjs Phenomenology of the Daseln
Strictly speaking, we cannot justifiably maintain that Heidegger’s
analysis of ’’human Dasein” has any direct bearing on Sartre’s theory of
consciousness, for Heidegger avoids appeal to consciousness in his descrip-
tion of ’’human Dasein” characterized as ”3eing-in-the-world." But there
is constraining evidence that Heidegger’s conception of ’’Nothingness” has
brought Sartre closer to his own notion of ’’nothingness,” and, moreover,
we can detect many points where the thoughts of the two men converge. Like
Heidegger, Sartre abolishes Husserl’s reductions, for both these philoso-
phers are concerned with the solution of ’’Being” based on a phenomenolo-
gical ontology; their focus of attention is on the very existence of ”Reing”
facing the world which Husserl discards. We also find traces of Heidegger
in -artre’s analyses of facticity and contingency, of potentiality and
instrumentality, of anguish, and of authenticity and inauthenticity. But
nowhere is Heidegger’s influence more conspicuous than in Sartre’s notion
of time. Here dartre almost replicates Heidegger’s conception, with the
exception of perhaps the idea and the explanation of present . In the brief
exposition that we shall now attempt we will confine ourselves to Heidegger’s
major work, his Being and Time
, published in 192?. This work, which Sartre
was obviously familiar with prior to writing his own magnum opus , exerted
considerable influence on Sartre’s thinking.
The perennial question which Heidegger asks in his Being and Time is:
’’What is the Being of the things-that are?”^And his original project was
to answer this question by providing threee sections on interpreting the
Dasein as temporality. Of these proposed sections only the first two
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reached the cress. The first section was entitled «A Preparatory Funda-
mental Analysis of Dasein." Here Heidegger sought to provide, through
phenomenological analysis, a methodical exposition of the
-fundamental
reality of existence: a temporal horizon within which the things ’in the
world’ come to have meaning and hence come ’to be* in tirae"48The second
section. "Dasein and Temporality.” sought to carry this theme forward by
"showing how the Dasein, in projecting the world’s horizon, founds
history.
wf the first section our sole hope i3 to explicate the aspects of
Dasein as they converge toward the fundamental structure of the Being of
the Dasein as Care (Do.rge). According to Heidegger, any solution to the
question "What is the Being of the things-that-are?" must begin by a pehno-
menological analysis of the Casein's
-standing-in" ( Instandlgkeit ^ in the
world, which will reveal the fundamental relationship of the Dasein to the
50things-that-are. And to understand Casein’s "standing-in" is to examine
the phenomenon of human concern ( Besorgen ) for things, for this "standing-
in 1 is not so much a spatial phenomenon as it is essentially a human rela-
tionship to things as "utensils," that is, the instrumentality of things.
And it is furthermore a human relationship of concern, of intention, of
meaning and knowledge. Thus the world is possible only through the "concern"
of Dasein. Here "world" clearly does not refer to the world of things; it
is the world of the Xch (mv world). But what is the structure of the Dasein
that makes meaning possible? In this context Heidegger sees three aspects
of the Dasein which engender this relationship of world-projecting concern
to the things-that-are. The two modes of this structure are the eleentlich .
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(authentic mode), and the jffie^en^l^ck (inauthentic) mode. In the authen-
tic mod© of standing-in the Dasein relates himself to things "in view of
the whole structure of what he really is."51Whereas in the inauthentic mode,
the Dasein is distracted by the petty necessities of everyday life and loses
sight of the full structure of his possibilities. The authentic aspects
are: realization of self as already cast into the world, facticity
^vy^hkoit^ ) ; understanding (Verstehen): and speech, discourse or lan-
guage (Egde). The inauthentic aspects are: ambiguity ( Zweideutikeit 'l
«
curiosity (^sty^ey); and prattle ( Gerede ). The aspects of each mode are
inseparable, for they are constituents of the basic act of standing-in.
The authentic mode of Dasein »s standing-in, if examined, will reveal
that the fundamental concern (Resorgen) of Dasein involves a self-extension
projecting toward what is unknown and £s not yet, so that being and meaning
may be instilled in the things-that-are, always in view of the fundamental
possibility that lies with the Dasein alone. But before we analyse the
fundamental ontological structure which underlies, unifies, and mkes
possible the aspects of the authentic mode, we must first examine the pos-
sibility of inauthenticity, for it is within this context that authenticity
becomes meaningful, again because authenticity is in part the realiza-
tion of Dasein* s forfeiture of his fundamental possibility.
The inauthentic aspects of standing-in are just as positive as the
authentic aspects; that is, ontologically speaking they are on the same
footing; together they form the two facets of the Dasein* s finltude. The
Dasein, insofar as he is finite, is cast into a world whose very condition
seems to be those trivial necessities of daily life, which take the form
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of "they" in Heideggerian language. This condition of the "every day
i.-asein" is the forfeiture (Verfallensein) of Dasein *s fundamental possi-
bility, that is, "not-being-itself" which is a genuine and positive possi-
bility of Dasein. This condition of Dasein finds roots in the finitude of
Dasein, which renders impossible a pure revelation of Being in a perfect
relationship to the things-that-are. Thus authentic existence must remain
as a directional ideal toward which Dasein strives in his attempt to extri-
cate himself from the inessential. The consequence of this is that man
exists in a state of impure j.>efindllchkeit
. whioh is what Heidegger calls
-4weideutjg lceit (ambiguity). This state imposes upon the aspect of genuine
understanding ( ^erstehen ) an impure element of curiosity ( Keugier ) • These
two aspeots, understanding and curiosity, are referred to as "originative
thinking" and "caleulative thinking" in Heidegger* s later works. Under-
standing reveals meaning of things whereupon it is exercised in a new
light; whereas curiosity or "caleulative thinking" merely recapitulates
the preconceived, the preconditioned and established meaning of things
imposed by the "they." In curiosity no new horizon of meaning is ever
invented.
The opposition between understanding and curiosity leads us to the third
aspect. Here we have the distinction between the inauthentic aspect,
prattle ( Gerede ) and its authentic aspect, discourse (Rede). Here under-
standing is permeated by prattle and thus becomes curiosity rather than
genuine understanding, whose expression can come about only through genu-
ine discourse.
Our next step is to examine the necessary and fundamental structure of
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Dasein's essential possibility, which underlies and unifies the aspects
which we have thus far discussed. What we seek here is an ultimate form
of concern which covers the entire realm of things that can enter the hori-
zon of the world of meaning. This form of concern touches the meaning of
all things-that-are. What is involved here is nothing short of the very
questioning of the horizon of meaning itself. Heidegger characterizes this
attitude as 3o£^e. The approximate English translation of this term is to
be found in the term "care." Here, in the stAte of Sorge (care), Dasein
confronts his fundamental possibility. The Dasein realizes "his own
reality as projection of the world horizon and, at the same time, as radi-
CO
cal finitude.’’ tie is both the very source of all meaning in the world
and nothingness as finite being. Thus this revelation puts Dasein' s whole
being-in-the-world into question; this pivotal point of authentic self-
discovery is what Heidegger terms Angst (anguish). But anguish is oroper
to the Dasein alone, and in this state the Dasein experiences the seeming
dissolution of the world in his recognition that he is cast into a world
whose meaning and being depend upon his meaning and interpretation of it
through genuine understanding and discourse. Thus recognition by the Dasein
of his total responsibility for there being a "world" leads to the further
recognition that "every moment of authentic existence must unite care for
each of the three temporal extases: the past, the present, and the
53future"—"the past which Dasein must assimilate as part of the authentic
Defindlichlelt « the future which Dasein builds out through the projections
of Verstehen (understanding), and the present of that dwelling with the
things-that-are that takes place in the Rede (discourse) which expresses
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his grasp of things. "^However, this recognition is possible only when
Dasem has reached the extreme precipice of inauthenticity, where he flees
the realities of his finite existenoe. And through Argst (anguish) the
caring Dasein discovers the very nature of that dynamic, finite structural
whole which is his existenoe. Thus in gorge (care), and through Angst
(anguish). "Heidegger has sought to unify the three modes in an expression
which underscores the characteristic temporality of each. In Sorge . he
says, Dasein discovers himself as Sich
-vorweg-im-sohon-sein-ln-einer-
1
6
“k?
%
n-Be^ (oglenden)
, i.e., as self-projecting Being (expressing the
futurity of the projection' in Verstehen ) that is already in a world (express^
ing the past nature of Befindlichkeit ) as being in company with the things-
that-are (which expresses the essential present act of coming to dwell with
the Sejenden discursive, temporal fruition that is Rede)
."^ith the dis„
covery of the dynamic structure underlying the three modes of standing-in,
Heidegger must now turn to the inner ontological nature of the discovered
structure—its nature as temporality.
We have seen how Heidegger expresses the essence of Dasein as his free-
dom to project himself in time beyond the here and now toward the future
that is not yet (noch nicht). And because the Dasein, in grasping the
fullness of his whole structure, reveals to himself at once his fundamental
possibility and his finitude, he must understand this in terms of his ulti-
mate end or limit. The cognizance of this absolute limitation is rooted
in his awareness of his Being-toward-death ( Seln-zum-Tode ) . Only within
this context does the Dasein* s "very possibility to be" become meaningful.
Thus every moment, every act, and every event must be viewed within the
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haunting awareness of death, and furthermore eaoh moment and each act
comes to a terminal dissolution. The freedom to project, to develop his
essence, endowed on every Dasein, must be viewed in light of the limits
imposed on the Dasein by his essential finitude. And when Dasein accepts
his essence as a Being-toward-death, all external influences and events
lose their overriding importance. When the Dasein confronts this Nothing-
ness
^ g heit ) of his own Being, all mundane events are seen from the
only authentic perspective. Thus Heidegger writes, "In anguishing the
Dasein discovers himself by the Nothingness of the possible impossibility
of his existence. "-^The Dasein realizes that his ultimate possibility is
death, that is, the impossibility of his existing forever. The Nothingness
of Dasein is the Nothingness of Being, which is to say that the Dasein
recognizes Nothingness as his ultimate end; the Dasein is but might not be—
he is finite as a Being-toward-death. And this grasping, willing, and
accepting the reality of his own Nothingness, which is imposed on him by
his radical finitude, is the very condition of his freedom.
The existential-ontological unity of the three aspects of standing-in
is, according to Heidegger, a temporal unity. Thus to each aspect of stand-
lng-in there corresponds a mode of temporality. And our next 3teo is to
I
examine each aspect of standing-in corresponding to a mode of temporality.
(1) The future.
It is precisely because the Dasein* s structure enables him to project
forward toward his possibilities that he can anticipate them and be present
to them now, which in a sense brings the Dasein* s future to the now-here.
And insofar as the fundamental possibility of the Being of Dasein is
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pointed toward the future, this futurity must in some manner guide the
Casein's whole self-development. Thus Heidegger concludes: The fundamen-
tal extasis of the Dasein is the future. For Heidegger all understanding
Q erstgfren ; is grounded in the futurity of Meeting toward possibilities,
i’hen to have an authentic understanding, the Dasein must always project
toward his future.
(2) The Past.
Again in projecting toward the future of possibilities the Dasein must
recapture his past. And to this extent the Dasein brings the past into the
realm of the here-now. But in so doing the Dasein must be aware of his
fundamental position—Defindlichkeit (facticity)—which is rooted in the
past. The past, as it were, is given, and the existence of the Dasein is
"turned” by what has come before. Thus future projection must take into
account the past.
(3) The present.
The fundamental projection of the Dasein toward the possibilities of the
future involves bringing the future and the past to the present. Here the
Dasein is in the creative process of making-present of what is present.
But the grasp of the present can only be expressed in genuine discourse
( Rede ) . Hence, in this manner Heidegger has at once unified the three as-
pects of authentic standing-in in time (it is well to mention here that
Heidegger likewise unified the three inauthentic aspects of standing-in,
which are inseparable from the authentic aspects. Unfortunately, we have
neither the time nor space to deal with this portion of Heidegger's Dein;:
and lime and the three modes of temporality.
ky
1th Husserl and Heideeger behind us. we are now prepared to analyte
dartre’s theory of consciousness.
THE HIATUS BETWEEN THE "BEING-FOR-ITSELF" AND "BEINO-IN-ITSELF
“
A. Sartre *s Point of Departure
In Sartre »s major philosophical work, Being and Nothingness , we find
the subtitle “An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology." In this subtitle
Sartre indicates his method and point of departure to his solution of the
problem of Being. And the title of his work seems to suggest the two re-
gions of Being which he proposes to consider, namely. Being (Deing-in-
itself
,
1 « etre-en-soi ) and Nothingness (Baing-for-itself
,
Vetre-rour-soi ).
Any interpretive analysis which purports to explicate the basic principles
underlying Sartre »s solution of the problem of Being will do well to first
clarify this particular phrase “phenomenological ontology. “ What does
“phenomenological ontology*’ mean for Sartre? The answer to this question
will be found in the important Introduction with which Sartre prefaces his
Being and Nothingness .
In these introductory pages Sartre traces the development of the con-
cept of the “phenomenon” back to the founder of the "phenomenological”
method, Edmund Husserl. For the phenomenologists the existent as “pheno-
menon” is limited to a series of appearances which manifest it; these ap-
pearances are neither exterior nor interior to the object under considera-
tion. They, in effect, reject the notion of the reality of a “Being-in-
itself” which lies concealed behind a series of appearances. On this point,
Sartre, remaining faithful to his claim of being a realist, however, deviating
from phenomenology, posits a transphenomena 1 being which, as it were, "over-
flows” its appearances. We shall elaborate on this notion later on, for
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the present suffice to say that this notion will present considerable
difficulties for Sartre as he attempts to reconcile his postulation of a
"transphenomenal being" (being-in-itself ) and his position as a pheno-
menologist. In our criticism we will deal with this problem in greater
detail. The phenomenologists
.
furthermore, assert that appearances as
such are all the same—they refer to one another yet none of them stands
in a more priveleged position in our consciousness. With this attempt the
phenomenologists hoped to have abolished the traditional dualisms (that
have obstructed the path of the philosopher since the time of Descartes)
by means of the monism of the phenomenon. One such dualism is the cleavage
between "interiority" and "exteriority"; that is, the notion that the real-
ity of a 'Being-in-itself" lies "behind" the "series of appearances" which
manifest it. This particular dualism Nietzsche characterized as "the illu-
sion of hidden worlds." The effort on the part of the phenomenologists,
if successful, will obviously obviate Kant*s distinction between the
"phenomenon" and the • thing-in-itself." In this light the phenomenologists
(Husserl and others ) Regard the "phenomenon" as relative insofar as it pre-
supposes someone to whom it is revealed, and absolute insofar as it reveals
itself as it is and as absolutely indicative of itself referring to nothing
but itself; hence, it is a relative-absolute. ^In this phenomenological
framework the distinction between "essence" and "appearance" can no longer
be maintained—the phenomenon must reveal at once both essence and appearance
of the object considered. "The essence of an existent is no longer a property
sunk in the cavity of this existent, it is the manifest law which presides
over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of this series
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....But essence, as the principle of the series, is definitely only the con-
catenation of appearance; that is, itself an appearance.*?9
Although by reducing the existent to its manifestations we have eli-
minated many dualisms, yet one still remains to plague the philosopher. No
matter how numerous the instances of appearance, they can never exhaust
the infinite number of possible appearances whioh the object to be identi-
fied can manifest. Thus, since only a few appearances, or even one, often
suffice in revealing the identity of an object, say a table, this single
appearance must be related or linked to the whole series of possible ap-
pearances which the observer may not or cannot perceive in such a manner as
to permit it, in some way, to have "a transcendent or transphenomena1
reference insofar as it refers to other phenomenal aspects which are not
given in this particular intuition."60 (This is clearly reminiscent of
Husserl’s concept of "ideation"). The opposition is no longer that of
"appearance" versus "being"; rather it is replaced by that of the finite
and the infinite or, better still, "the infinite in the finite ,
"
6lthat is,
the problem of "relating the single appearance which ^s now to the ap-
pearances whioh it is not but to which it is indissolubly linked.
"
620ur
immediate problem then is to clarify the "being of this appearing."
In considering this problem, if the appearance is examined from the
context of its appearing, then our concern must at the same time include
the description of its concrete manifestations, for we are here assuming
that that which manifests itself really jjs. But in affirming that that
whioh manifests itself (the object) really ^s, we are saying that one in-
stance of its appearing (one single appearance) does not and cannot provide
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the whole series of possible appearances, yet by the very fact that this
single instance of appearing is possible implies that the object already,
in some sense, exists. Thus at any moment the '’being" of that which
appears always "overflows" the given appearances that the individual ob-
server may perceive. And in this light Sartre distinguishes the "being of
phenomenon" from the "phenomenon of being." which are, for him, inseparable
since the latter, insofar as it has transphenomenal reference, must refer
63to the former. And the function of "phenomenological ontology" is pre-
cisely to clarify the relation between these two aspects. Sartre calls it
ontology because, for him, appearance really is, "appearance is not sup-
ported by any existent different from itself; it has its own being";
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and it is phenomenological in the sense that "being" is inextricably
linked to the concrete manifestations of those appearances which, as it
were, always posit a consciousness to appear to. (Strictly speaking,
Sartre’s phenomenological method does not follow rigidly Husserl’s method.
We shall olarify this point in our criticism.) This appearing to con-
sciousness is the phenomenon’s "being for a consciousness." Just as the
phenomenon presupposes a consciousness, consciousness must also always be
consciousness of something; that is, every act of consciousness posits a
"transcendent" object (or "content") outside itself. Consciousness is
always in the form of consciousness-of ; it is invariably objectively
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oriented. Consciousness, therefore, is positional consciousness of the
world. Thus consciousness, to the extent that one conceives it as "know-
ing," this "knowing" is nothing other than knowledge of an object. Implicit
in this idea that a knowing consciousness can be knowledge only of its
52
object is the idea of a consciousness which is conscious of itself as con-
sciousness. From this Sartre asserts that whenever I ara conscious of an
object. J am at the same time conscious that I am conscious of the object,
and moreover this consciousness does not reflect on the positional con-
sciousness as its object, indeed it is "pre-reflective" : Positional con-
sciousness and self-consciousness appear concomitantly, that is. as soon
as positional consciousness appears, self-consciousness is there. For
otherwise I may find myself trapped in an infinite regress, i.e.. I may
be led to postulate the idea of a consciousness which is conscious of
itself as a consciousness which is consciousness
. • . and so cn ad infini-
iuffi. It need not concern Sartre that one may not have knowledge of this
self-consciousness, for he is concerned here sclely with what is known and
not with how things are known. We should also remember that Sartre*
s
prime preoccupation is ontology and not epistemology. This primary self-
consciousness, unlike consciousness which necessarily posits an object,
does not posit its own consciousness as an object. Sartre seems to sug-
gest here that all positional consciousness implies the necessity of a
non-positional consoiousness, and concludes that all positional con-
sciousness of an object is at the same time non—positional consciousness
(of) self. (The "of" is bracketed to show that its function ia purely
grammatical.) And this primary consciousness Sartre calls the "pre-reflec-
tiv© cogjto ." differentiating it from the Cartesian cofrito . as well as the
authentic mode of reflection; this latter concept we shall discuss later.
It was in criticizing the Cartesian ooglto that Sartre came upon the
notion of the pre-reflective ooeito . For Sartre this primary ("immediate"
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or ’’spontaneous” ) consciousness (of) self not only precedes but conditions
the Cartesian co^ito, for self-consciousness must not be considered »’a
new consciousness but as the only mode of existence which is possible for
a consciousness of something.
”
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It is a region of being involving a pure
"translucenee" prior to all knowledge. To clarify this notion of immediate
consciousness, Sartre provides the example of pleasure.
6?
Aooording to
him, pleasure and consciousness (of) pleasure are logically indistinguish-
able. "Consciousness (of) pleasure is constitutive of pleasure as the very
mode of its own existence, of the material of which it is made, and not
as a form which is imposed by a blow upon a hedonistic material. Plea-
sure cannot exist 'before* the consciousness (of) pleasure. "^The immedi-
ate consciousness (of) pleasure is not a representation, it is a "concrete
event, full and absolute, "^"it is a plenitude of exi 3tenee,"^\ nonsub-
stantial absolute, a pure "appearance" existing only as it appears. Yet,
this appearance itself is a form of being.
Thus far in his analysis Sartre hopes to have established three main
points: (1) things are reduced to their concrete manifestations, namely,
the entire series of their appearances (this entails nothing short of a
complete revision of the problem of the "phenomenon"); (2) these appear-
ances are not merely subjective appearances (thus raising the problem of
the "being of the phenomenon"); (3) and since these appearances are present
to the consciousness, a further problem must be confronted, and that is to
determine the nature or being of this perceiving subject, that is, the
perclpiens which is revealed through consciousness (this in turn leads to
the question of the pre-reflective ooerlto ). From this Sartre feels he has
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provided an adequate basis for both knowledge and self-consciousness.
The next question which Sartre must ask is: "Is the 'transphenomenal*
beiri actually the being which the phenomenon of being refers?" To phrase
it differently, "Is consciousness sufficient to provide the foundation for
the appearance qua appearance ?»72fo answer this question we must first
recognize the fact that just as there must be a being of the pereioi
(perceived thing), there must also be a being of the percipjens (perceiving
consciousness), lest we fall into the solipsistic position of having to
identify the object with the consciousness of the object, whereby the
object as such would simply vanish. The being of the known must be dis-
tinct from the being of the lcnower . But insofar as the phenomenon must
always appear to and for a consciousness ( percipjens ) . and must at the same
time be the manifestations of the object ( percipi ) as appearing, it seems
that the being ( esse ) of the phenomenon resides in neither the percipi
nor the percipjens . but rather demands both for its being.
73We have seen that the notion of the "intentionslity" demands that con-
sciousness must always be conscious of something other than itself. Thus,
in every act of consciousness there must be a "transcendental" constituent.
Hence, the problem of being cannot be found in a concept of consciousness
alone. Consciousness (of) self, we concluded, is non-positional; that is,
it does not posit itself as an object, and moreover, it is revealed through
reference to positional consciousness which is always object oriented,
which is to say, positional consciousness emerges as not-self
.
for it
invariably refers to the other-than-self. This transphenomenal reference
or not-self cannot be detached from its "appearances" as phenomenon. And
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the revelation of the transphenomenal beina
is possible only because it exists, in some
sciousness of it. ?4Thus Sartre nr1 /.
^ • belng-other-than-eonseiousness
,
other than itself," 7W'The transphenonenal being of what exists for con-
aaawa,s e3dsts it§2l£-”76Then the existent which is revealed as appear-
ance to consciousness amst have its mm being, for its appearing to conscious-
ness is possible only because it rests on the foundation of its own being. 77
Were it otherwise, the existent would dissolve in consciousness and would not
be able to appear to consciousness as somethin* other than consciousness. As
consciousness directs itself toward an oblect, it "transcends" the existent as
merely "ontic" phenomenon, that is, the consciousness "transcends" the existent
as merely appearing toward the existent as an intelligible object. This means
precisely that consciousness in transcending the ontic asnect of the existent
captures the geanfe or sense of the transphenomenal being. Here again ve see
how the phenomenon of being and the transphenomenal being are inextricably re-
lated. From this we can conclude that the phenomenon of Being is founded on
Being, and the phenomenon of Being is Being only insofar as it is revealed to
consciousness. At this point we must make a preliminary distinction between
Being as transphenomenal being and the being of consciousness. In the later
chapters Sartre refers to the being of consciousness as "Being-for-itself"
78
(1T etre-pour-sol ) in contrast and opposition to the "Being-in-itself"
( 1 1 etre-en-soj ) of the Dhenomenon. Clearly, that this is possible for Sartre is
the consequence of his notion of consciousness as that which emerges as other-than-the-
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being-of-the-phenomenon which is revealed as appearing to consciousness.
Here we see. in embryo. Sartre’s original and possibly his most important
theory, namely, the opposition between Being-for-itself and Being-in-
itself which is engendered through the innermost constitution peculiar to
consciousness alone. In other words, consciousness always emerges only
as a form of being which is £21 the transphenomenal being. This opposi-
tion and tension will be kept alive throughout the entire six hundred and
fifty-two pages of his Bgjnft Nothingness . And it is indeed Sartre’s
primary concern to show that the Being-for-itself continually strives for
an unattainable synthesis with the Being-in-itself
,
and furthermore, it
is because the Being-for-itself can detach itself from Being-in-itself.
thus generating a hiatus, that Being-for-itself can come into a meaningful
relationship with Being-in-itself.
In the concluding pages of his Introduction Sartre provides a brief
analysis of Being-in-itself. For him Being-in-itself is neither '’created"
nor does it "create itself" ; it is neither passive nor active; neither
affirmative nor negative; it simply is . "It is an immanence which cannot
be made real, an affirmation which cannot be affirmed, an activity which
cannot aot, because it is clogged ( emnate ) in itself ."79Being simply is
4jl itself i it is "opaque" to itself because it is full of itself. Being
is what it is . it is "massive" and "full" being. Thus, Being-in-itself
is absolutely contingent, neither derivable from possibility nor reducible
to necessity; it simply is: it is superfluous (de trop ). "Uncreated,
without reason for being, without any connexion with any other being,
Being-in-itself is de trop (superfluous) for eternity .... Being is . Being
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in itself* Beinf? is wh&t it $<» tt®0--pv ,S 11 i3 * rho >-®*s°n why Sartre characterises
Being-in-itaelf as radically continent will become clear as we continue
with our exposition. Insofar a, Being-for-itself
.
whloh ls nothlnj, ^
than the revelation of Being-in-itself
.
and Reing-in-itself wherein all
beins is concentrated, must be related to Being in general, that is. they
constitute the two regions of Being, we must examine both of these region,
of Being, let u, first turn to Baing-for-itself. or human consciousness.
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B. Uae Two Regions of Being
1. For-itself
a. The Theory and Forms of Negation.
At this point In his inquiry S.rtr. has apparsntly rsached an Impasse.
He has so far distinguished the two modes of 3eing S the For-itself, which
as such, is devoid of being, and the In-itself. which is full and massive
being. He must now establish the relation between these two modes of
being which for him is "an original emergence and is a part of the very
structure of these beings." He must now concern himself with the follow-
ing questions: (1) "What is the synthetic relation we call being-in-the-
world?" and (2) "What must man and the world be in order for a relation
between them be possible?"R2The answer to these interdependent questions
must be sought in an investigation of different types of human conduct;
consequently, Sartre begins by examining the three notions, namely, inter-
apjarehensiqp o£ destruction , end negative judgment . Let us look
briefly into each.
83(1) Interrogation. Every question presupposes a being who questions
and a being which is questioned, and furthermore every question pre-
supposes an ignorance on the part of the being who questions. R4This ignor-
ance is for oartre a pure "non-being" in the consciousness of the being who
questions. But when I ask the question "Is my pencil on the table?" the
negative answer (my pencil is rjot on the table) implies another form of
"non—being . " This Sartre describes as the "non—being of being in trans-
cendent being." Thus the question is a "bridge set up between two non-
beings j the non-being of knowing in man, the non-being of being in trans-
cendent being." ^And finally, if the answer 4s affirmative, a third non-
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being is introduced. The fact that I assert that the pencil is on the
table presupposes the recognition of the pencil if it were in fact on the
table, but this recognition is only possible through the elimination of
what it is not. Thus even an affirmative reply imposes this third form
of non-being which Sartre calls the "non-being of limitation."
(2) Apprehension of Destruction?6 We found in interrogation the pres-
ence of pure non-being; however, non-being is not limited to interrogation
but is present in the prehension of the structure of destruction. In the
destruction of a bottle, it is reduced to pieces of glass. Kere destruc-
tion means "change" in the presence of a human witness. This is, of course
not to suggest that there could be no destruction in the absenoe of a human
consciousness to witness the destruction. What it means here is that in
the strict sense, disorganization or destruction supposes organization and
which is possible only when there is a human consciousness viewing,
organizing, and ordering things. The notion of apprehension of destruc-
tion is meaningful only when both states, prior and posterior to the event
of destruction, are known to the human consciousness. Then in this sense
we may say that the destruction or annihilation of a form A is a form of
non-being which is possible only as it appears to a human consciousness.
(3) Negative Judgment. let us take the case where I recall placing my
pencil on the desk, and someone placed it elsewhere, say, on the bureau;
as I return to my desk and look for the pencil, I judge: my pencil is not
on the desk. By this very judgment that I claim something is not , namely
the pencil is not on the desk, a non-being is thereby introduced. This
non-being, however, is not derived from negative judgment; rather, negative
6o
judgment is derived from non-being. (Sartre obviously derived this idea
from Heidegger* s essay on "What Is Metaphysics ?“) Thus the notions of
interrogation, destruction, and negative judgment each introduces its
particular form or forms of non-being, and, according to Sartre, the source
of all non-being is to be found in the For-itself, that is, the human con-
sciousness which all three notions presuppose.
P
'Before we elaborate on
Sartre *s concept of non-being, let us first look into the positions which
Sartre rejects; these are the dialectical concept of nothingness of Kegel
and the phenomenological concept of nothingness of Heidegger.
According to ;artre, Hegel conceives of pure being and pure non-being
as ‘'two abstractions which could be reunited only on the basis of concrete
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realities # “ and “the true concrete is the Existent with its essence: it
is the totality produced by the synthetic integration of all the abstract
moments which are surpassed in it by requiring their complement.
"
91
fiegel
follows Spinoza »s ojmis determinatio est ne?otio and asserts that all being
receives its determination from non-being, in which case non-being is in-
serted into being itself • Kegel writes : “This pure Being is pure abstrac-
tion and consequently absolute negation, which taken in its immediate
Q2,
moment is also non-being. “ We must conclude, then, for Kegel pure being
and pure non-being are the same thing. Or more accurately, Hegel has in-
serted non-being in being itself, all being is at the same time non-being.
Sartre explicitly rejects this position; he, on the contrary, claims that
non-being is outside being; being is invariable prior to non-being. VJe
shall soon see how this explanation is possible for Sartre.
Heidegger, on the other hand, as we have seen, stresses the tension
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between bein? and non-being. 9
3
Eaeh of these is regarded as an antagonistic
force, and their mutual repulsion engenders the real. In his analysis of
various modes of human conduct (hate, prohibition, regret, etc.) Heidegger
concludes that each mode includes the apprehension, under one form or
another, of nothingness. And the human attitude which engenders the funda-
mental confrontation of nothingness is anguish (Angst ) wherein the Dasein
recognizes himself as a being-toward-death ( Seln-zum-Tode
. radical fini-
tude) and the contingency of the world. Human reality emerges from an
awareness of what his being is in the face of what he is not. And the
world as contingent can be disclosed only by human reality, which, in this
sense, imposes the contingent dimension on the world. Human reality as it
realizes the world as contingent, raises the question: "How does it happen
that there is something rather than nothing?" and in so doing it recog-
nizes the world as "suspended" in nothingness ....
Both these positions are inacceptable to Sartre, for they have over-
looked the structure of the mind , wherein alone the origin of non-being is
found. We must, however, recognize that Heidegger* s position has brought
us closer to Sartre* s position. Heidegger, while explaining the more basic
modes of nothingness, failed to account for the less significant modes,
such as "the pencil is not on the table," "the unicorn does not exist,"
etc. But since very negation ("negatities") is s\xpr>orted by being, and
furthermore, each negation is the intrinsic constituent of the reality of
being as revealed to the subject, clearly, then, we cannot ignore these
"minor" negations.
Sartre, then, asserts against Hegel that non-being is "outside" of being
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but, nevertheless, always appears against a background of being. But what
is it that makes this non-being possible? ’What is it that generates this
non-being and by which non-being "happens to things?" We have seen that
whatever appears must always appear to a consciousness, and that Being-in-
itself simply is, that is, it is neither passive nor active. Furthermore,
dartre asserts that in knowing the consciousness knows what it knows by
eliminating all that which is not what it knows. Consequently, in knowing,
consciousness introduces negation. Hence, non-being must find its origin
in the lor—itself, i&rlier we concluded that destruction, insofar as we
consider this notion to imply "change," i.e., form A is destroyed if it has
been changed to another form E, introduces non-being. By this Sartre
meant that only human consciousness can understand annihilation of, say,
a form A. oartre seems to suggest that to understand destruction, that is
destruction if it is to be meaningful, we must presuppose the presence of
a human consciousness, rather than the idea that no destruction is possible
in the absence of a human witness. Again in negative judgment non-being
is exposed, for to make the judgment that "my pencil is not on the table"
is to assume that I would recognize my pencil if I should see it| and this
recognition is possible only by eliminating all that which is not my pen-
cil. Thus, for Sartre, it is from human consciousness wherein all non-
being emerge, and, in fact, every act of knowledge implies the nihilatin(T
power of the For-itself. The Por-itself, then, continuously generates non-
being through which it can organize, limit, and order the universe.
The next question put to Sartre with particular urgency is: vhat is
the nature of human consciousness such that nothingness comes to things ?
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This power to nihilate, to generate non-being is a peculiar characteristic
of the human consciousness alone and is called ”neantisation.»?4The ap-
proximate English translation of this term could be either "nihilation.”
’’negation," or "noughting.” In its activity of negation the human con-
sciousness, or the For-itself, is viewed as that which is ’’outside” of the
Eeing-in-itself. The For-itself. unlike the In-itself, is not massive,
dense, or full being. It is, if you will, a hole in Being-in-itself (”un
trou dans l’etre”). We:re it otherwise, this negating capacity would vanish.
For according to Fartre, only ”what is not” is able to understand ”vhat
is.” This simply means only ”what is not Being-in-itself” is able to
apprehend ”what is Being-in-itself.” Thus Sartre concludes, Reing-for-
itself is not Being-in-itself, ”it is its own non-being.”
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let us here recall Sartre's previous conclusion: every question in
essence posits the possibility of a negative reply. Then it is always
possible that the being in question may unveil itself as a Nothingness,
and consequently the questioner in realizing this nihilating withdrawal in
relation to the given must view the presentation as perpetually fluctuating
between being and Nothingness. It is essential, therefore, that the
questioner has the permanent possibility of disassociating himself from the
causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only being.
The questioner (For-itself) then, must be isolated, detached, disengaged
from and outside of Being-in-itself if he is to have the possibility of
bringing forth non-being. lie must, therefore, lie outside of the deter-
ministic framework that characterizes the world. In sum, human consciousness
must be free : freedom must be the being of consciousness. In this context
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then, just as ny past is not the oondition of my present, my present is
not the oondition of my future. My past does not determine my present
because there is "nothin,?" in me which lends itself to determination. 96
Then, according to Sartre, what I was is not the foundation of what X am
any more than what I am is the foundation of what I shall be.
This freedom which manifests itself and of which we are conscious
emerges from our consciousness of anguish ("angoisse"). 97As I face the nos-
sibles, my possibles, which I alone can determine, I am anguished. Anguish
is nothing other than this fear which is induced in me as I confront my
possibles in the light of the responsibilities entailed in my determining
these possibles.
Before we proceed further in our exposition, let us here recapitulate
dartre’s main contentions. First, we may say that non-being and negation
under the various forms we have examined, namely, interrogation, destruc-
tion, and negative judgment, find their origin in the form of Nothingness
inherent in the heart of consciousness itself. Thus, it is in the absolute
and pure subjectivity of human consciousness that the origin of non-being
which we ascribe to things is found. Secondly, this power of "nihilation"
or "nihilating withdrawal” of the For-itself
,
which continuously generates
non-being into the world, is known as "neantisation." And every judgment
and act of knowledge is in some form a "neantisation" (negation). Thirdly,
since human consciousness can generate non-being, it is a characteristic of
the human consciousness that it is its own non-being, its own nihilation.
Fourthly, insofar as tho For-itself generates non-being, it itself must lie
’'outside" of being (Being-in-itself ) , and this means precisely that it is
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free, that is. it is disengaged from the causal order of Belng-in-itself
.
The For-itself, then, is freedom. At this point it must be apparent to
the reader that Sartre uses the terms "For-itself," "human reality,"
"human consciousness,"
"Nothingness."
"consciousness" and to a certain
extent even "nlhllation" synonomously. Nihilation. however, as we shall
see later, is the act by which the For-itself projects toward the In-
itself
,
and artre frequently adopts the term "ecstasy to designate this
act. esta sy, as it were, is the act by which the For-itself escapes from
itself toward the Being-in-ite.lf
.
in Imowinr. desiring, judging, etc.
1 rom this peripheral exposition we can already detect the radical
separation between the two regions of Being in Sartre *s system. This oppo-
sition will be subject to further emphasis as we proceed along our exposi-
tion. Our next step is to show how Sartre, through his notion of bad
shows how the For-itself in its very being is permeated with nothing-
ness.
b. Bad Faith^8
In our previous discussion we have concluded that consciousness for
Sartre is "a being such that in its being, its being is in question insofar
as this being implies a being other than itself.""And with our analysis of
the theory and the forms of negation, we were led to the conclusion that
Sartre sees consciousness as a being "the nature of which is to be con-
scious of the nothingness of its being.
"
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But this does not suffice, for
the human consciousness is not only the being by whom "negations" are dis-
closed in the world; it is also the being who "can take negative attitudes
with respect to himself."
101
lloreover, "it constitutes itself in its own
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flesh as the nlhllation of a possibility vhioh another human reality pro-
X02jeets as its possibility. Thus, when a prisoner attempts to escape,
he regards the policeman guarding the gate as a No£. indeed some men
(e.g.. caretakers, overseers, goalers) are constantly regarded as Not to
the extent that the Not is inherent in their very subjectivities which
they establish as a perpetual negation. 1030ther attitudes, such as irony,
penetrate even deeper into the consciousness. In irony a man negates
what he posits s he makes an affirmation which demands itself to be under-
stood as a negation; "he creates a positive object which has no being
other than its own nothingness.
«
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This form of subtle behavior leads to
the following questions T,Vhat is the being of consciousness which has the
possibility of denying itself? This kind of behavior, however, does not
lend itself to generalization. It appears then the best approach would
be to examine one attitude which is essential to human reality and, as
such, it directs its negation toward itself. This is the attitude of
bad faith (mauvajse fol). 10^
Bad faith, unlike the general form of falsehood, is directed toward
oneself. The essence of a lie or falsehood supposes that the person
uttering the lie is in complete possession of the truth. Its aim is to
deceive the other person toward whom the lie is directed. Lie as such
does not involve the inner structure of present consciousness, for all the
negations which constitute it bear on objects which are removed from con-
sciousness; these objects do not exist, they are transcendent. Here, of
course, we are speaking of the ideal lie, wherein the liar is not the vic-
tim of his own lie. Frequently, however, the liar is, to a certain degree
6?
a victim of his own lie. that is. he tries to convince himself of his own
lie. These more common forms of lie appear somewhere between the ideal
lie and bad faith. In bad faith the lie is directed toward oneself.
Usually the person who is practicing bad faith is covering with an opaque
screen some unpleasant truth, or else he is presenting as truth some
pleasant untruth. Here there does not exist the duality of the deceiver
and the deceived, both the deceiver and the deceived are one and the same
subject, it implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. Thus
the deceiver must know in his oapacity as deceiver the truth which is
hidden from him in his capacity as the one deceived. Moreover, the deceiver
must know the truth exactly in order to conceal it more carefully and he
does this "in the unitary structure of a single project.
"
10
^But how is it
possible that the lie should still subsist when the duality which condi-
tions it has vanished? And since bad faith demands of the person afflicted
with this condition to be conscious (of) his bad faith, it would seem that
to the extent he is conscious (of) his bad faith he is in good faith. It
would appear that bad faith on principle obviates itself. For Sartre,
however, these difficulties are not as crippling as they might appear at
first glance. Indeed, bad faith is very precarious, it is "metastable"
(unstable, subject to sudden change) and fluctuates between good faith
and "cynicism" (the deliberate attempt to deceive oneself—an extreme form
of bad faith), but nevertheless, it presents an autonomous and durable
form. A person who lives in bad faith may have occasional awakenings to
his own "cynicism" or good faith, yet there is still this prevalent charac-
teristic to his life.
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This parade* of bad faith does not lend itaelf to the sort of peyoho-
analytioal explioation provided by the dualism of the Ego and the Id. The
dissimulation of bad faith supposes the unity of a single psyohio organism
in which the same thing is yelled and unveiled, known and unknown, accepted
and at the same time rejected. The duality of Bfeo and the Id favored by
the psychoanalysts is seen to replace the duality of the deceived and the
deoelver. and this Sartre does not allow, for the notion of bad faith
supposes psychic unity in human consciousness. Dualism then, is alto-
gether inadequate to explain that which essentially supposes unity.
For purposes of clarification we shall examine the patterns of bad
faith and attempt a description of them. In this regard, therefore, we
must seek to answer the question: "What must be the being of man if he
is to be capable of bad faith?"
A typical example o? bad faith is when a woman who consents to go out
with a man for the first time, well aware of his intentions, yet ignoring
these his less noble intentions. The man»s conduct, discreet or otherwise,
may be conducive of certain conclusions which the woman may refuse to
recognize. And her interpretation of his conduct is subjectively imposed;
she conjures up the interpretation to suit her modest temperament; she
procrastinates the urgent need for a decision while in constant recogni-
tion of the unavoidable eventual confrontation with her choice. She evalu-
ates the actions and the conduct of the man at face value, that is, as
Being—in—itself ; she reflects only on the superficial and refuses to ack-
nowledge that which is ostensively concealed. And finally she rejects her-
self as that which stimulated the conduct in the man, and instead realizes
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herself as not being her own body but rather as an object, a Being-in-
itself. Thus, she is at once transcendence and facticity* transcendence
insofar as she surpasses herself as not being herself, and factioity
insofar as she realizes herself as an object and interprets at face value
only the overt conduct of the man. These two properties are coordinated
and realized in bad faith such that one necessarily implies the other.
And because in bad faith is manifest the property of transcendence, its
aim becomes that of establishing the notion that "I am not what I am.” In
transcendence the self regards itself as a thing and tries to flee and
escape from it, yet at the same time remaining unwaiveringly itself. Hence,
In affirming transcendence as being facticity, the self is at once affirm-
ing facticity as being transcendence. The self, then, is defined by the
concept of ”transcendence-facticity” in this manner, is metastable , for in
bad faith the self fluctuates between transcendence and facticity. This
concept, however basic, is but one aspect of bad faith. Another aspect
inherent in bad faith is the duplicity derived from human reality which can
be expressed in the following manner: the Being-for-itself of human
reality implies complementarily a Being-for-others . Implicative here is
the idea that to any particular conduct two interpretations are always
possible—that of the Self and that of the Other. Although, ontologically
speaking, these two ”looks” have different status, this, however, does not
suggest that the Self is in a privileged position to apprehend the "being,"
whereas the Other apprehends only the appearance. According to Sartre,
then, these different aspects of bad faith converge upon the same structure,
that is, the structure which demands that human reality must be viewed as
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a being ’’which is what it is not and which is not what it is.” Here
again, like our analysis of the forms of negation, there appears a form
of duality which is "integrated” in the unity of consciousness.
But how is it possible for the For-itself to be conscious of these
concepts of continual oscillation? In this connection let us consider
the antithesis of bad faith, namely, the concept of sincerity. In sin-
cerity the self must be for itself only what it is, but this requires the
self to be identical to itself, hence a Being-in-itself. But if bad
faith is to induce illusion and good faith is to remain as an ideal which
human reality strives for, then we cannot allow this principle of iden-
tity to subsist, at least not in this oontext. For this concept of iden-
tity removes the possibility of bad faith and makes good faith the being
of human reality, Pan exists as consciousness of being and not as a
3eing-in-itself
. No human condition typifies him as a being which is
exactly what he is. in other words as a Being-in-itself. Here Sartre sub-
stantiates this claim with the example of the waiter of a cafe, for sim-
plification let us call him Pierre. The conduct peculiar to a waiter
does not express his being what he is, but instead expresses his "playing
being a waiter in a cafe”; he plays with his condition to realize it.
The waiter cannot be immediately a waiter in the sense that this inkwell
is an inkwell. The waiter reflects on his condition as a waiter, he
realizes that it is precisely this person (the waiter) that he must be but
which he is not. But Pierre can be a waiter only in representation, he
represents himself as a waiter, and to this degree there is no denying that
Pierre is a waiter. However, he is not a waiter in the mode of Being-in
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itself but in the node of being what he is not. The discrepancy lies in
the fact that the sub.leot oannot be identical to the obleoti no natter how
Insistent Pierre nay be in positing himself as this being, by this very
positing he has surpassed this being, and not toward another being, mind
you, but toward emptiness, toward nothingness. Looking ahead then, sincer-
ity is an impossible task to achieve i
109
its very structure implies contra-
diction with the structure of human consciousness—the being which is
necessarily not what it is and is what it is not. With human consciousness
comes a form of fluidity which enables the For-itself to escape identi-
fication to any particular human condition. Lack of us is that "divine
absence” of which Paul Valery speaks*
Consider now the mode of being that concerns only a single self; that
cf being sad. Surely here is manifest the essence of sincerity, namely, I
am sad in the mode of being what I am# There seems no apparent reason to
suppose the infiltration of any element of bad faith. But to be sad means
only to make oneself sad, which implies that I am not sad prior to making
myself sad. This process is continuous rather than a spontaneous event
which generates sufficient momentum to perpetuate this state of conscious-
ness (oonsoiousness (of) being sad—sadness). Then to the extent that I
make myself sad I may lose myself in being sad and consequently I play at
being-sad. Here again nothing else is at stake other than the fundamental
structure of human reality which is not what it is and is what it is not.
Human consciousness is never supported by being which is its own sub-
stantial being. Consciousness is manifest as consciousness in acting which
constitutes its being. Consciousness is its own being, that is. It is the
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revelation of being but that it is not itself being. To the extent that
gooo faith Imposes on consciousness a block identity, deaands it to be
Being-ln-itself. to be what it is. it is irreconcilable to the fundamen-
tal structure of For-itself
.
let us substantiate this concept with one final example. The thief
who steals is frequently haunted by an intolerable feeling of guilt. He
blames his inclination to steal on the misgivings of fate; he considers
his predicament "different" from those of other thiefs; he would vehe-
mently refuse to characterize himself as a thief, for this is not an innate
and permanent quality. Here is clearly a man in bad faith, who, while
acknowledging all the facts imputed to him, refuses to draw the conclusion
which they impose. If a friend should critioize his inconsistent behavior,
he may show himself indulgent and admit to the fact that he is a thief, in
which case, by acknowledging that he is what he is, he is to this degree
110mlsincere. lhe condition of bad faith induces him to reject that he is a
thing in the sense that his condition is a permanent one, i.e., his mis-
takes constitute for him a destiny. Writh the recognition of each misdeed
he feels that he is born anew, pure and undetermined. This is certainly
acceptable if he intends his assertion "I am not a thief" to mean "I am not
what I am." That is, if he declared to himself, "To the extent that a
pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of a thief, and to the extent
that I have adopted this conduct, I am a thief. But to the extent that
human reality escapes final definition by patterns of conduct, I am not
one."^^I)ut if he "slides surreptitiously towards a different connotation
of *being,* he understands *not being* in the sense of * not*Being *in-itself.
»
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He lays claim to *not being a thief* in the sense whioh this table is not
an inkwell. He is in bad faith.”112
In sincerity the thief recognizes himself as a thief and submits a
public confession. In so doing he hopes to have surpassed his condition?
to phrase it differently, he hopes to be regarded as no longer being the
same thief whom he acknowledged as being and thus escape into the region
of freedom and of good will. He attempts to reassure himself and escane
from himself by self-contemplation (introspection). He regards himself as
a thief, as a Being-in-itself
. He hopes to establish his freedom through
his confession and self-discovery. He forces his new self on the Other.
But are these not precisely the phenomena of bad faith? Both bad faith
and sincerity then characterize an escape from oneself.
Je can conclude then in sincerity one passes continuously from ”the
being which is what it is, to the being whioh is not what it is and in-
versely from the being which is not what it is to the being which is what
113it is." likewise bad faith causes me "to be what I am in the mode of
•not being what on© is,» or not to be what I am in the mode of ‘being what
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one is I" Bad faith and sincerity are inextricably related, indeed bad
faith is possible only because sincerity itself is founded in bad faith.
And the underlying condition of the possibility for bad faith is that
"human reality, in its most immediate being, in the intrastructure of the
pre-reflective cogjto . must be what it is not and not what it is."11 "’
Sartre, by his specious definition of For-itself, as that being which
is what it is not and is not what it is, sought to render the inherent and
essential paradox of the fissure in the massivity of being (Being-in-itself)
and this fissure is none other than consciousness. As the previous remarks
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on the analysis of bad faith have demonstrated, the For-itself oscillates
continuously between the being which is not what it is and the being
which is what it is not. Consciousness, as it continually escapes block
identity, eoncretization and permanence is permeated with nothingness.
This analysis, apart from its incommensurable value in preparing the
ground work for an investigation of the structures of consciousness reveals
Sartre as a master dialeotitian pursuing, in one of the few instances,
a genuine phenomenological analysis. The next project put to us with
particular urgency is an investigation of the immediate structures of con-
sciousness.
o. The Structures of Consciousness.
’/ith our remarks on his Introduction, on the negations, on bad faith,
and briefly on freedom, we have established Sartre* s main postulates. The
remaining of his treatise, although of considerable length, is but an ela-
boration and development of the positions already outlined. Thus our whole
task is reduced to the problem of the relation between the Being-for-itself
and the Being-in-itself
. V7e have already attempted a brief and super-
ficial distinction between the opacity of the Being-in-itself and the trans-
lucidity of the Being—for—itself • .Je must now direct ourselves to an
examination of the immediate structures of the Being-for-itself, in hopes
of clarifying the radical opposition between the two regions of being. Our
conaem here is with the immediate, if not fundamental structures of con-
sciousness. These are: (a) Impersonality; (b) ftonsubstantiality, (c) lack
and desire, and (d) values and Possibles. We shall oonsider eaoh in turn.
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(1) Impersonality11^
All particular forms of consciousness, as we have seen, must ultimately
require the presence of a pre-reflective cogjto
. Our previous investiga-
tions lead us to conclude that the pre-reflective cogito does not posit an
object, yet at the same time it is autonomous and acts as a witness of its
own being. This witnessing, or what Sartre calls "self-presence,” con-
stitutes the relation of the subject to itself, and as self-nrosenoe the
subject is indissolubly linked to itself. In this self persists the per-
petually unstable equilibrium from the fact that this self is not able to
achieve self-coincidence. The pre-reflective cogito . therefore, must be
impersonal} that is, it does not constitute an Ego as the unifying factor
of the successive representations of a consciousness. This notion is de-
veloped in greater detail in an article entitled "The Transcendence of the
Sgo." where Sartre argues explicitly against Husserl. In this article
Sartre asserts that the Ego is a superfluous postulation, since con-
sciousness is defined by intentionality; that is, it is always object
oreinted. It is the objects (all objects of consciousness) that are the
stipulating and specifying elements of any individual consciousness, since
consciousness cannot exist without the objects of consciousness. Even the
constant elements of consciousness such as personal identity cannot be
taken as the 3go; such a feeling of personal identity is rather "an acti-
vity of consciousness itself by means of a ‘transversal* intentionality."117
This "transversal intentionality" is but a recollection of past conscious-
ness brought to the present. Consciousness does not lend itself to eon-
cretisationj it is pure and absolute transluoidity whioh faces the massive
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opacity of Being-in-itself
. To introduce the massive and opaque being of
the ago in consciousness is to reduce the For-ltself into an In-itself in
the mode of self identity. Such an ego-logical structure would effect that
very artesian substantialization of consciousness which Sartre rejects at
the outset. Consciousness, according to Sartre, is permeated by nothing-
ness and is unable to bear the weight of the heavy and massive Ego. 115
In both the Cartesian and Kantian notions of the Coglto . the conscious-
ness is regarded as an object of reflection. And it is precisely from this
reflective act that the Ego is thought to emerge. Thus Sartre sees the
Ego as the result and creation of the reflexive act. In this sense the
Ego, like any other concept, is but the object of consciousness. In the
event that I am conscious of, say, a chair, the Ego does not emerge. It is
misleading to assert that "I am conscious of a chair,” instead it would be
more accurate to say "there-is-consciousness-of-a-chair." In a reflective
act the object of consciousness appears concomitantly with self-oonsoious-
ness. When I am conscious of this chair I am at once conscious that I am
conscious of this chair; and this in egological language would constitute
the Ego performing the reflexive act. (We are here reminded of our previous
comments on the notion of the pre-reflective Coglto .) This is, of course,
inaccurate, for what Sartre meant to express by the concept of the pre-
reflective coglto is not the positing of an Ego but rather the fact of
immediate presence to self. Sartre *s aim here is quite basic for his pheno-
menological ontology. He seeks to establish here a consciousness without
Subject. All Being-in-itself is external to consciousness, For-itself as
such is nothing but emptiness of Being-in-itself ; it is infected with
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nothingness. The For-itself exists solely for the object. Consciousness
is deplete of being, it perpetuates its absence of being j which is to say,
it is in a continuous process of nlhilatlon. All the substantial value
that the For-itself my possess is borrowed from exteriority, from Being-
in-itself toward which consciousness is directed. Consciousness Itself
must be devoid of all constant elements, and consequently no egological
formulation is possible for consciousness
e
(2) Nonsubstantiality.
Again, a3 we have seen, Descartes fell into error when he claimed
gfigjtP ®E£L2. SSa* " In this formula Descartes assumed that the
elf is identical with the Self as thinking, that is, the existing Self is
identical with the thinking Self, and concluded that the Self must be a
"thinking substance." This position trapped Descartes in a plethora of
difficulties and necessitated his postulating God to extricate him from
this lonely predicament and to place him once again in the world. This
difficulty seems to have originated from Descartes* initial choice.
Descartes made his point of departure from the reflective Cogito rather
than the pre-refleotive ooglto . K© postulated "I think that I think" in-
stead of the more plausible "I think of something." He did not recognize
the intentional character of consciousness, and as a consequence he fell
into an infinite regress having to posit a thinking being which reflects
on itself as a thinking being and so on and so forth. Sartre was cautious
to avoid this fallacy and made his departure from the pre-reflective
cogito (the consciousness whioh is at once self-consciousness and conscious
/of/ something). From consciousness emerges the nothingness of pure
translucidity which is invariably intentional, directed towards that which
is beyond consciousness. Consciousness
,
therefore, unlike the Cartesian
"thinking substance,” must be nonsubstantia 1.
xhe In-itself
, insofar as it remains consistent with the principle of
identity, that is, insofar as it is exactly identical to what it is,
cannot have possibles. "Its relation to possibles can only be established
from the outd.de, namely, by a being which faces the possible s."^ 2§ut a
being which faces possibles must carry in itself the ontological dimension
of non-being, for being acquires signification only against the background
of non-being. And since it is precisely through consciousness that non-
being happens to things, then to the extent that consciousness implies
nothingness, to that very degree nothingness implies the possibility of
questioning being. But if the For-itself is capable of nihilation and
negation} if it is by consciousness that non-being happens to things; if
nothingness emerges from consciousness, and if the For-itself is the being
which is not what it is and is what it is not, then it must necessarily
be nonsubstantial. were it otherwise, For-itself would be relegated to the
realm of Being-in-itself
,
opaque and saturated with substance.
The concepts of consciousness as nothingness, as negation, as nihila-
tion, as a being which is not what it is and is what it is not, as impersonal,
as nonsubstantial are clearly intimately connected. If we can establish
but one of these interrelated and interwoven concepts, we have essentially
established the others, for each necessarily implies the others. These
concepts, if not concentric to one another, at least overlap one another.
And they all converge toward one central theme, namely, the translucidity
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and emptiness of consciousness. Let us now examine the remsinirF two struc-
tures of human consciousness! the For-itself as lack and desire, and the
for-itself as haunted by values and possibles.
(3) Lack and Desire.
The process of nihilation does not simply consist of an introduction of
emptiness into consciousness. If the For-itself is to sustain nihilation,
it must itself, in some sense, be a lack of be±r^. l22lt is not as though an
external being has expelled the In-itself from consciousness, rather the
For-itself is continuously determining itself not to be a Being-in-itself
j
that is, it determines its being by means of a being which it is not. The
For-itself posits itself as not being the In-itself. This mode of not
being is peculiar to the For-itself, for it touches the inner nature of
the being which is not what it is not. There are. however, other modes of
not being, i.e., a table is not a chair. In this mode of not being, both
the table and the chair are left intaot, that is, untouched; the relation
here is external, and it is established only by the presence of a human
witness. However, in contrast, there are negations which establish an
internal relation between what one denies and that concerning which the
denial is made. The most characteristic of such internal negations is
that of lack. This lack is engendered only through the upsurge of human
reality, and it is in no way contaminated by In-itself which, as it were,
is all positivity. Insofar as lack appears only in a human world, it must
constitute three elements; these are, according to Sartre: ’’that which is
missing or 'the lacking,' that which misses what is lacking or 'the existing,'
and a totality which has been broken by the lacking which would be restored
p0
by the synthesis of »the lacking* and »the existing*—that is 'the lacked.*"
Thus, when I say that the moon is not full and that a quarter is lacking,
I at once presuppose in my intuition that quarter which is lacking. For
it is only within the context of a realized totality which constitutes
•’the existing" and the lacking" that "the existing" as missing "the lacking"
becomes intelligible. The totality becomes the foundation of "the existing"
as lacking. The given itself simply is what it is; it is nothing more than
a Being-in-itself
,
and we cannot say of it as either complete or incomplete,
for it bears no relation to other beings. "The lacking" is the complement
of "the existing" and together they form the synthetic totality of "the
lacked." But "the lacking," insofar as it is determined by the synthetic
whole, is constituted in the being of "the existing." And likewise, it
is the full moon (the synthetic whole) which confers on the crescent moon
("the existing") its being as crescent, which is to say it is what-is-not
that determines what-is.
If we assert with Sartre that lack is possible only through lack and
that lack appears only through human reality, then we are led to conclude
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that, in some sense, human reality is itself a lack.
The fact that human reality is a lack appears still more forcefully in
Sartre *s consideration of desire. Here Sartre rejects the notion of desire
as a psychic state, for the covert assumption here is that desire manifests
the being whose nature is to be what it is. But a being which is what it
is does not call for completion, it simply is. The call for completion
arises when there is a human transcendence which surpasses the incomplete
toward the complete. Thus an incomplete circle isolated from human con-
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sciousness simply is; it requires no completion, for as an open curve it is
complete and full. Then in the case of "hunger" or "thirst" there need be
an external transcendence which can surpass these desires toward the to-
tality "satisfied hunger" or "satisfied thirst."
>ior, on the other hand, can we conceive of desire as a conatus in the
manner of a physical force or drive, in effect, an efficient cause. The
SSm&s as a producer of states cannot be identified with desire as the
appeal from states. An organism manifesting certain symptoms may be inter-
preted as an organism deprived of water, but these symptoms are positive
phenomena and refer to themselves only. There can be no mental-physical
correspondence such that the physical symptoms posit a psychic state in
consciousness. We have seen that psychic states as such cannot exist in
consciousness, for consciousness is empty. If desire is to be desire to
itself, it must necessarily, by nature, be an escape from itself toward
the desired object. Desire, then, is a lack of being and at the same time
haunted by the being of which it is desire.
We have seen that the bond between the existing and the lacking is not
one of simple contiguity. Although the lacking is, strictly speaking,
absent, it is profoundly present in the heart of the existing, and this
is because the existing and the lacking are at the same moment apprehended
and surpassed in the unity of a single totality. Hence everything which
is lacking is lacking to ... for •••• The For-itself (to recall what we
said earlier) is its own nothingness; it is its own foundation insofar as
it denies in relation to itself a certain being or mode of being, and,
furthermore, it denies itself as a Being-in-itself. What it lacks, then.
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is being, which if it possessed would constitute for it a totality—
a
For-itself-in-itself. Thus, to the extent that the For-itself points
toward that which it lacks, it is haunted by Fveing-in-itself
. The pro-
ject of the For-itself is directed toward that perfection (the For-itself-
in-itself ) which constitutes the unified totality. If such a synthesis
were possible, then the For-itself would sustain in itself a real Self;
that is, the utopian identification of For-itself and In-itself would thus
be realized. The For-itself, as we have seen, incessantly strives to
identify itself with the Being-in-itself
,
and its attempt is again and
again frustrated, for such a synthesis is not possible. In such a synthesis
there would be entailed certain contradictions, for instance, the For-
itself, which posits itself as a non-being, if it is contaminated with In-
itself, could no longer possess the power of nihilation, nor its translu-
cidity} it would no longer be the being from which non-being, negation, and
nothingness emerge. Hor could it be the being which is not what it is and
is what it is not. Hence, a Being-for-itself can never be a Being-in-
itself without losing, Ipso facto , its most characteristic features of con-
sciousness. However, although this synthesis is unattainable, the For-
itself finds its signification in this haunting totality; the For-itself
must be seen as projecting towards this unified whole, this lack, this
impossible synthesis . From this it becomes clear that the For-itself is
indissolubly linked to the In-itself in the manner of a lack to that which
defines its lack. The For-itself does not lend itself to the sort of
"statufioation 11 which would be necessary if the For-itself is to be iden-
tified (synthesized) with the block, massive, full, and opaque In-itself.
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The F or-itself
,
then, on principle, can never become a Being-in-itself
.
(4) For-itself as Haunted by Values and Possibles
The F or-itself *s attempt to close this gap created by its yearning to
be an In-itself gives rise to another aspect of its basic structure, that
of value. Value is the being which the For-itself continually desires.
This aspiration, however, is clearly hopeless, for we cannot reach absolute
fullness of being without thereby losing ourselves as consciousness of
being, as emptiness of being. Value is another one of those notions that
emerges with the apparition of human consciousness, and in this sense
human consciousness must be the being by which values exist.
Value as a fundamental structure of the For-itself appears from a con-
tradictory point of view. This is so because as project (nihilation) it is
"a tearing from . . . towards" a not-self from In-itself which is other than
the For-itself and so helps to constitute the value of the For-itself* s
projection. Value, then, stands beyond any individual consciousness and
haunts the For-itself as a being which the For-itself incessantly strives
for and to which it is indissolubly linked. And because value is in-
separable from human reality, it cannot have the substantial and permanent
qualities which render it as something outside itself. Here the only per-
manence is the contingent necessity by which the For-itself aspires toward
a form of being which is, in principle, unattainable. Value, then, as the
expression of the For-itself* s persistent yet futile striving toward that
which is impossible, namely, Being-in-itself
,
emerges as a kind of perma-
nent lack which is perpetually present.
Once again we have witnessed the notion of a For-itself aspiring for
something which it itself is not, and to this extent at least, this lack
inherent in the :'or-itself refers to a transcendent existent. That which
the lor-itself lacks in order to constitute itself as a complete self is
what dartre calls "possible." Possibility, then, forms an integral part
of human reality since it expresses the protective character of a For-
itself which is constantly moving toward that which it is not. Possibility
is realized with the apparition of the human consciousness as nihilation,
for it shows that "the "or-itself exists only insofar as it remains at a
certain distance from itself as a being which both is and is not its possi-
bilities. "^2%ut the For-itself does not possess "oossibilities" in the
manner it possesses objects, for possibilities cannot be separated from
human reality; possibilities provide, to a certain extent, the meaning of
human existence. Nor is it permissible to speak of man as merely possi-
bility; possibility as possibility must always remain in some sense unful-
filled; possibility always entails at once a radical impossibility, were it
otherwise it would no longer be a possibility but an identity in the mode
of self-coincidence. Just as we speak of the For-itself "nihilating , " we
oould in like manner speak of possibility "possibilatingj" for nihilation
is an act by which the For-itself realizes its own bein^ by projecting
towards that which it is not and whioh it never can be. Possibility as
such requires human presence; it arises as soon as consciousness appears,
i.e., the full moon as a "possible" is a consequence of a human witness—
the For-itself surpasses beyond the crescent moon toward the full moon.
This form of surpassing is possible only because, in some sense, For-itself
if a possibility, an absence from itself, existing at a distance from it-
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self. Cnee again is the underlying: Implication that the For-itself does
not exist as a self-coincidence or a thing. Human consciousness, then, in
its nihilating movement toward its own possibilities involves it in a re-
lation with what it is not, and in this manner it projects toward a beyond,
a totality of existents which constitutes the world. Consciousness realizes
its relation with the world by regarding it in terms of what it is not
itself. The world as the totality of existents. that is. as the In-itself.
towards which the For-itself incessantly strives, serves as a constant
correlate of the For-itself* s projection toward its own possibilities. We
must, therefore, admit two elements; first the relation of the For-itself
to its own possibility, this Sartre calls "Circuit of Ipseity," and, secondly,
the totality of existents (the world) through which the For-itself "tra-
verses" in its movement towards its own possibilities. The For-itself in
its act of nihilating itself (asserting that it is not an In-itself) pro-
vides In—itself with signification as that which consciousness is not;
consequently the In—itself becomes the objective correlate of the For-
itself* e nihilating act. The world existents take on meaning through
their relationship to the projects of the For-itself . 126The In-itself and
the Tor-itself, thus regarded, are clearly distinct, yet inseparable, for
without In—itself there could be no For-itself, and conversely, without
For-itself the world as object of consciousness could not subsist.
In the course of our exposition we have examined in some detail each
successive stage in the development of Sartre *s almost systematic project
of draining out all being from the For-itself. In the examination of each
negative structure of consciousness (negation, interrogation, destruction,
P6
negative Judgment, bad faith, and sincerity) Sartre arrived at the same
conclusion, namely the For-itself is empty of being and that wherein which
nothingness resides. Our subsequent investigations of consciousness
revealed more forcefully its impersonal and nonsubstantial nature, and,
furthermore, consciousness is seen as a lack which projects toward values
and possibles. All this merely reinforces our original conviction, and
although we have not yet penetrated the structure of the In-itself
,
we have
clear indications of its antithetical nature as it opposes the For-itself.
We have commented briefly on the nature of this opposition, however, we
do not propose to elaborate on this opposition until we have adequately
explicated the structure of the In-itself. Suffice here to remind the
reader that this theme is of predominant importance and that it consti-
tutes the very purpose of Sartre* s Being and Nothingness .
d. Consciousness and Time.
The examination of the various structures and activities peculiar to
human consciousness has led Sartre to attempt to establish a more inclusive
principle that will unite these interrelated structures and activities.
Uke Heidegger, Sartre believes that this principle is to be found in the
concept of temporality. This is a natural, if not unavoidable, conse-
quence of the preceding development, since like Heidegger, Sartre regards
the self as the being which continually projects itself beyond itself toward
that which it is not and perhaps even more relevant, Sartre asserts with
Heidegger that all the activities of the Foiwits^lf hapnen "in time." let
us now consider eaoh of the three temporal dimensions which constitute
12?
Sartre* s phenomenological description of temporality.
8?
(X) Past^^
The concept of "passivity" of human sensations which is frequently con-
ceived as some form of present cerebral trace of the past by the psycho-
logiste nust new be rejected, for according to Sartre, just as the extended
cannot be explained by means of the unextended, the past oannot be explained
by the present. Moreover, Sartre also rejects any suggestion that pur-
ports to explain the past as something unreal, or as Bergson oonoelved It,
as a purely "honorary existence." Doth these conceptions of the pest iso-
late the pa3t from the present, and furthermore these notions presuppose
the consciousness as some sort of solidified being, a Being-in-itself.
Buoh a conception of consciousness obviates all hope for an adequate explana-
tion of the past.
Here as elsewhere Sartre remains unwaiveringly faithful to his original
notion of the or-itself
,
and through it he will attempt a solution to the
problem of temporality. Insofar as the In-itself is full, massive, dense,
and compact being, it can have neither a history nor a past, neither a
present nor a future; it simply is—it is gratuitous, unjustified and super-
fluous. It has a past only insofar as a human witness makes reference to
it. A house that was once green and is now painted red does not have the
color green as its past. Only in the memory of a human consciousness could
remain an image of a green house. Apart from human consciousness the green
house would be lost forever. Only the human consciousness can support this
particular past state, namely, the once green color of the house. Cn this
account, however, Sartre may be challenged. One might argue that, in some
sense, a nail used a second time may not perform its faction as efficiently.
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and that in this sense it carries its past with it. To this Sartre would
reply that even in this case the past no longer is, for there exists a
new molecular structure in the nail that affords a different genre of ac-
tivity. And that in this sense no permanence whatsoever may persist. On
this point Sartre is not totally convincing.
In considering the past of the For-itself Sartre asserts that it is
but the "solidification" of the For-itself. In saying "I was angry" I am
referring to a past state wherein no possible may reside, this past state,
then, becomes an In-itself. And Insofar as I refer to this my past I am
facing it as an In- itself, as an external thing. I am never my past, but
always "I was my past." The For-itself as a being wherein freedom is mani-
fest and wherein possibilities reside, cannot be identified with its past.
The or-itself is always beyond what it is.
(2) Present.
According to Cartre when we speak of the present we mean to be present
to something
.
and this something is invariably a Being-in-itself
. Thus only
the For-itself can be present to something. The In-itself merely is. To
be present means to be in contact with In-itself without being identified
with it. And this is possible only because the For-itself negates the In-
itself as that to which it is present. (On this point Sartre, unlike
Heidegger, stresses the For-itself as apprehension of the massive Being-in-
itself as negation of itself.) Here again we are reminded of the basic in-
tentional structure of the For-itself. Thus regarded the present is a
flight from Being-in-itself, for the For-itself posits the In-itself and
negates it at the same time. "The present instant is a fictive deification’
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which in fact does not exist.
»
130The present, then, is not. It is s flight
oy the "or-itself from the beinB that it was (its past) toward the being:
that it will be (its future). We are thus led to conclude that the For-
itself as present is not what it is (past) and is what it is not (future).
As in our previous analyses, here a-ain, i. evidence of Sartre’s remarkable
consistency.
(3) Future.
Just as there is no past without the human consciousness, there could
be no future without human consciousness. And furthermore, just as the
In-itself has no past, it has no future. The For-itself, on the other hand,
knows and plans its future or anticipates its future insofar as it faces
the future. The future is related to a possibility which is already con-
tained in the For-itself. In this sense the For-itself projects toward the
future only to come back to itself. It is, in short, a relation and a
position of the For-itself to For-itself.
The future as that toward which the For-itself projects must define
each movement of consciousness. Fach of our gestures is explained and
specified by the future. This future is the expression of the fundamental
incompleteness of our being; it constitutes that lacking being toward which
the For-itself aspires. Without this lacking being, the For-itself would
suffer the weight of identification with the In-itself. This is why we
must again apprehend For-itself as a non-being whose complement is at a
distance . The lacking as such, however, is never reached. While the past
is empty of possibilities, the future is overflowing with possibilities.
These possibilities are precarious for the For-itself as freedom may or may
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not realize them. Thus the future as possibility, as that toward which the
For-itself aspires, must remain eternally problematic, eternally in ques-
tion, and eternally unfulfilled.
V/ith his description of the three temporal modes Sartre is prepared to
attempt to establish time as an organic unity. Here Sartre differentiates
between that order of successive events (before and after) which can be
characterized as static temporality and that progression whereby the pre-
sent becomes the past and the future becomes the present, which can be
characterized as dynamic temporality .
In static temporality it is the instant which is itself before some
instants and after others. The instant in isolation is intemporal, for
temporality always posits a succession or progression of instants. If,
however, we assign the character of In-itself to two instants, we cannot
establish a tie between them. The link must be sought in a being which
lies outside. Descartes assigned this task to God; Kant chose an intem-
poral "Self" for this function. Both these solutions require of the intem-
poral to perform the task of temporalizing . Sartre, however, feels that
he can avoid this difficulty by malting before and after an internal rela-
tion which is only intelligible to and relatable by a being which is itself
in some sense before itself. Thus the For-itself can be conceived ns the
being which can make intelligible the notion of before-after. The ror-
itself alone can bring unity into the succession of time.
The past as past constitutes for the For-itself its own past. Although
theFFor-ltself cannot be identified with its own past, it nevertheless
carries it behind itself as its solidified and immutable background. In
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this regard Sartre expresses this facing-the-past as an ecstasy toward the
past, that is. in the sense of "standing out from" the past. likewise
there is the ecstasy which is an upsurge into the future, a project toward
completion which is never to be attained. The third ecstasy involves the
present. In this ecstasy For-itself escapes from itself as it is present
to being. Although Sartre does not grant this ecstasy any ontological
priority, he nevertheless considers it the basis of the other ecstasies.
Unlike Heidegger, Sartre is not willing to give priority to the future.
The three moments of temporality, insofar as any particular moment will
necessarily involve the others, are interrelated. 133And each temporal factor
of the ror-itself is a futile projection which on the one hand seeks to
strive toward self-coincidence and on the other hand to maintain itself
intact as the being of consciousness. Sartre expresses this dispersive
nature of these three temporal moments as the "diasporic" mode of the For-
itself* s being.
With respect to dynamic temporality, ^^Sartre considers the following
questions "Why does the present become the past?" mftiat is the meaning of
duration?" '"/hat is the meaning of progress?" To answer these questions
Sartre investigates the meaning of progress. According to Sartre progress
cannot be explained in terms of change; progress is understandable only in
light of the fundamental incompleteness of the For-itself, which in its
endless yet futile pursuit of In-itself constitutes the source of time. The
For-itself, therefore, is the denial of the instant (nresent), the rejection
of the past, and the pursuit of the future. If there were progress and,
therefore, no duration, then the For-itself would be a solidified past and
92
a statufied future, in short, a Being-in-itself
. Thus progression in tine
finds its signification in the structure of the For-itself
,
and conversely
there could be no For-itself without progress in tine. The For-itself is
a perpetual flight away from the past toward the future.
e. Pure and Impure Reflection
Our final remarks on consciousness will concern Sartre’s notion of reflec-
tion. This notion, however, must not be confounded with Sartre’s previous
notion of the ^.re-reflective coglto . The pre-refleetive coglto is non-
positional consciousness of self; it is non-reflecting consciousness or,
as oartre calls it, "non-thetie consciousness,*’ "conscience non-positiorelle
(de) soi." Reflection, on the other hand, is authentic reflection; here
the Tor-itself clearly and explicitly reflects on itself by positing itself.
rom this "scissiparity" of reflection emerges a double being (a dyad),
namely, the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciencess-wthe
reflecting-reflooted. Thus the reflecting consciousness must in some way
also be the consciousness which it reflects. And paradoxically the re-
flected consciousness must remain an object of reflection, for Sartre re-
jects absolute identification. The ontological structure of reflection is
similar to the relation between For-itself and In-itself. We have seen that
it is nothingness which separates the For-itself and the In-itself, and In
like manner nothingness separates the reflecting consciousness and the re-
flected consciousness. In the case of the For-itself and the In-itself
the nlhilation was performed outside of consciousness, that is, it was
directed at the In-itself. In reflection, however, the nlhilation is per-
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formed within consciousness itself.
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In reflection the For-itself seeks to achieve identity and coincidence
with itself in such a way as to leave the For-itself intact. It is for
this reason that the For-itself posits itself as an object. But this at-
tempt is doomed to failure, for the intentional structure of the For-
itself affirms itself as rjo£ being the object upon which it is directed.
In its attempt to capture itself as an object the For-itself must surpass
itself and express itself as something other than this object. From
another point of view this difficulty again proves insuperable. Insofar
as the For-itself is a being through which negations emerge, it cannot
grasp itself as an In-itself without first negating it. And by negating
itself as an In-itself it can no longer grasp itself as In-itself. To
succeed the For-itself must transform itself into an In-itself while at the
same time preserving Itself as I' or-itself, this as we have seen is a mani-
fest impossibility. "The For-itself can never be completely objectified
13?and internalized at the same time." The most characteristic feature of the
For-itself, then, is this permanent impossibility of stabilization.
There are, however, two modes of reflection, the pure and the impure .
In pure reflection the reflecting consciousness is directed upon the naked
reflected consciousness (the non—positional consciousness) treated as a
"quasi-object.” This mode of reflection, however, is limited, for there
must necessarily be a gap between the reflecting and the reflected j but this
is not to suggest that the reflected consciousness is merely a datum of
consciousness which stands completely detached from consciousness and exists
as other than consciousness, for as we have suggested, there is a certain
identity between them. This act of reflection penetrates the reflected
94
consciousness in all three of its temporal moments, for the temporal
moments constitute an integral ontological aspect of the For-itself. Hence,
reflection is consciousness of the three temporal modes.
In impure reflection consciousness considers itself as saturated with
the succession of particular psychic states, i.e., desires, passions,
emotions, affections, and other factors that make up our everyday psychic
life. This mode of reflection Sartre calls "psychic temporality." Insofar
as these particular moments constitute the individual’s psychic life, they
are very much a part of consciousness and consequently in this sense cannot
be reduced to a complete In-itself. On this point, however, Sartre is not
very clear; he sometimes calls the psyche a "hypostatized For-itself" and
other times he refers to it as an inchoate form of In-itself. With these
definitions the strict delineation between the For-itself and the In-itself
can no longer be maintained. Concerning this problem, however, Sartre
seems to have, somewhat artificially, relegated the psyche to the realm of
the Being-in-itself
,
since he regards In-itself as that which in the strict-
est sense is not For-itself.
The two modes of reflection are clearly interrelated. Through the
purification of impure reflection we arrive at the pure reflection. The
distinction between pure and impure reflection is necessary because from
this distinottion we can distinguish "original temporality" (revealed
through pure reflection) and "psychic temporality" which emerges from impure
reflection. Insofar as psychic facts appear to consciousness through re-
flection, psychic temporality must always be a derivative form, and to this
degree it must be regarded as a Being-in-itself. Furthermore, psychic
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temporality necessarily exists as that which merely is or has been
, since
its constituents are a series of "nows" or "those which have been."
Another characteristic feature of impure reflection is that its psychic
facts invariably refer to a world which appears as a kind of shadow accom-
panying my existence—a shadow which is revealed to me in every act of
pure introspection. This accompanying shadow may be "ideal" but neverthe-
less is, since it is revealed to consciousness.
The primary concern in our analysis of reflection is again to show the
impossibility of resolving this fundamental dilemma which confronts the
;or-itself
,
namely, its futile desire and relentless effort to be both
For-itself and In-itself ; to seek to appropriate the In-itself yet remain-
ing pure T or-itself . How that we have the analysis of the first region of
being behind us, that is, the Being-for-itself
,
we are in a position to con-
sider, in greater detail, the nature of that region of being to which we
have so frequently alluded, namely, the Deing-in-itself
.
2. Being*in-itself.
ctYipxtftfcd our description of the Being-for-itself
,
and we saw
why, i or this aspect of being, Sartre chose as its guiding thread the
examination of negative attitudes, and why the underlying condition of the
For-itself must be its permanent possibility of non-being. One of Sartre*
s
original goals, however, was to resolve the problem: "What is the original
relation of human reality to the being of phenomenon or Being-in-itself ?"
And we concluded earlier that for Sartre this relation between the two
regions of being is a primitive up-surge, and it forms a part of the very
structure of the For-itself. Indeed, this would not be an external relation
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conceived as uniting two substances originally isolated, for the Being-in-
itself is conceived as the synthetic totality ( transphenomenal being) of
which the nonsubstantial consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes
only the articulation. On the one hand, the In-itself, in order to be,
needs only itself, for it refers only to itself. On the ether hand, the
or-itself as its own nothingness is as far removed as possible from the
In-itself. The relation of the For-itself to the In-itself, therefore,
cannot be founded in the In-itself. which as In-itself simply^ Rather
the relation is constitutive of the For-itself. Thus such questions as
n
. ince the In-itself is what it is, how and why does the Being-for-itself
have Icnowledge of the Being-in-itself ?" and "What is knowledge in general?"
characterize this relation that we are now pursuing.
a. Knowledge as a Relation between the For-itself and the In-itself.
According to Sartre there is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and
discursive arguments are only instruments which lead to intuition, they
are not examples of knowing. As soon as the intuition is reached, the
methods utilized to attain it are effaced before it. Intuition, however,
cannot be understood as the presence of the thing ( Sache) "ln person" to
consciousness as conceived by Husserl, for the In-itself can never by it-
self be presence. It follows then, intuition is the presence of con-
sciousness to the thing. Consciousness must of necessity be consciousness
/of/ (the brackets are to emphasize that the word is inserted for gramma-
tical reasons) something. Consciousness which is not consciousness /of/
something would be consciousness /of/ nothing. Consciousness in the form
of the "reflecting-reflooted" dyad, stipulates the condition that the re-
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fleeting exists only in order to reflect the reflected, end that the re-
flected is a reflected only insofar as it refers to the reflecting The
two terns of this dyad, then, point to each other, each subsisting insofar
as the other subsists.
W* have stated wlier that non-being is an essential strueture of
presence. Presence entails a radical negation as presence to that which
one is not. which is to say. that that which is present to me is what is not
me. Furthermore, this non-being is implied, a priori
, in every theory of
knowledge, for any notion of an object is possible only by an original act
of negation which would designate the object as other than consciousness.
Thus the original relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is
negative. Put negations as such emerge only through the For-itself.
Knowledge, then, is neither a relation, an activity, a quality, nor a
virtue} it appears as a mode of being of the For-itself insofar as it is
a *’presence to ..." This original act of negation, it must be noted, refers
to an internal negation, in contradistinction to an external negation. Let
us clarify this distinction. In an external negation a witness establishes
an external bond between two being, as in the case when I say "A chair is
J20t a table.” Here the foundation of this negation is clearly neither in
the table nor in the chair. Both these objeots are left untouched and
intact. As objeots they are simply what they are. By an interna} negation,
on the contrary, “we understand such a relation between two beings that the
one which is denied the other qualifies the other at the heart of its
14-0
essence—by absence.” Thus in the case of internal negation whereby I
assert: ”1 am not intelligent,” I intend prima facie to indicate that "not
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beins intelligent*’ is a certain negative qualification of my being. From
their nature it is evident that such negations cannot be applied to being
In-itself
,
and that they must belong to the Being-for-itself. Only the
For-itself can be determined in its being by a being which it is not. And
if the internal negation can appear in the world, it is only through the
For-itself that it comes into the world. Only the For-itself, as the
being which can appear to itself as not being what it knows, and can con-
stitute knowledge, for only that which is not can know that which is.
Here we must clear a common dilemma. It is often objected that all
negations presuppose cognition as their prior condition, for it is argued
one cannot negate without first possessing some knowledge of that which one
is about to negate. This objection hAs some merits; for it is undeniable
that consciousness is unable to know that from whioh it is completely cut
off. But here we must regard the qualities or thing denied as *'a constitu-
tive factor of the being of the Being-for-itself ^In faot it is in
terms of the being—otheivthan—consciousness that consciousness can make
known to itself that it is not. Thus the ^or—itself is the non-being which
receives its determination through the massive and opaque presence of the
Being-in-itself. By this view Sartre opposes the concept of materialism
whioh purports to establish a substance (knower) in terms of another sub-
stance (object known) in hopes that they may be merged in one act of
knowledge. An examplification of this original relation is found in the
case of fascination . Fascination exemplifies the immediate fact of know-
ing where the knower vanishes under the overwhelming focus on the known.
Insofar as the knower is fascinated by the known, the knower is reduoed to
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pur. negation of the known.142Yet the ft.oinated intuition remains at a
distance from the object, otherwise the For-itself would merge in a fusion
with the In-itself. "In fact the condition necessary for the existence of
fascination is that the object be raised in absolute relief on a back-
ground of emptiness; that is, I (the knower) am precisely the immediate
negation of the object and nothing but that.""^
Knowledge, then, expresses solely the fact that "there is" being. It
is pure solitude of the known in the sense of immediate presenoe of the
known as pure dejj^gd Identity with the knower. The term that best captures
the essence of knowledge is the verb "to realize." Realize here covers
both the aspect of awareness and the aspect of malting. Thus knowledge is
realization in this two-fold sense; I realize that "there is" being (aware-
ness of being), and I realize being (to make that which appears, or to
make appear.) Through my knowledge I make that "there is" being; through
my knowledge I make the world appear. Here Heidegger's influence is appar-
ent, for it will be recalled that Heidegger, too, in this sense, asserted
that "knowledge is the world."
Our preceding exposition has shown us a For-itself which denies con-
cretely that it is a particular object. We must now inquire into the nature
of the For-itself which renders possible knowledge of a specific object
against the background of the knowledge of a total world. It would appear
that knowledge of a "this" is possible if we emphasize some specific
negation against the background of the knowledge of the total world which
144
is necessarily present. But insofar as the totality is an internal onto-
logical relation of "thises," it can be revealed only in and through the
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individual "thlses." To phrase it differently then, "the presence of the
For-itself to the world can be realized only by its presence to one or
several particular things, and conversely, its presence to a particular
thing can be realized only on the ground of a presence to the world.
Insofar as consciousness makes itself be, in the unity of a single up-
surge, the totality which is not being, being stands before consciousness
as the totality which is not consciousness. The very meaning of con-
sciousness lies outside in being, yet it is through the For-itself that the
meaning of being appears. Only that which is able to negate is able to
£jake the world appear. This negation, however, insofar as it involves the
world and "thlses" (In-itself) entails in it an element of externality.
Of external negations such as "a chair is not a table" we have said that
the determining relation resides neither in the chair nor in the table.
The "this" (the chair) and "that" (the table) emerge from the For-itself
through an internal negation. It is the For-itself that delimits the dumb
and massive In-itself through the act of nlhilation. This is but a modi-
fication of Spinoza * s omnis determinatio est negatio . Insofar as the ex-
ternal negation cannot belong to "this" or "that," it cannot be objective;
that is, it cannot belong to the In-itself. Nor can it have subjective
existence like the pure mode of being of the For-itself which is pure in-
ternal negation. Thus external negation must remain "in the air" exterior
to the In-itself as well as to the For-itself. External negation, pre-
cisely because it is exteriority, must be substantiality, yet i-eonically
it cannot be referred to any substance. It is therefore nothing, its
being is to be summoned by the For-itself. From this then space cannot be
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regarded as an external relation, since space is that by which For-itself
realizes ’’this" as external to "that." The For-itself through its internal
negations knows and delimits '’this" and knows and delimits "that" such
that it realised "this" as external to "that." Although the notion of
space supposes the existence of external objects, it nevertheless is sub-
jective, for it is only by consciousness that "this" is realised as exter-
nal to "that," and it is this very realization that constitutes the notion
of space.
b. The Structures of the In-itself: Quality. Potentiality, and
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Instrumentality.
If we wish to characterize more precisely the nature of the In-itself,
we shall have to consider briefly the structures of the In-itself. To the
In-itself Sartre ascribes three features; they are: quality, potentiality,
and instrumentality.
(1) Quality.
1^
The being of the "this" when considered apart from all external rela-
tions with the world or with other "thises" is nothing other than quality.
Quality is not simply subjective determination, i.e., the yellow of the
lemon is not a subjective mode of apprehending the lemon; it the lemon.
On the other hand, nor can we conceive of an object that appears as pure
and empty form which fuses together its disparate qualities. The truth of
the matter is that the lemon is extended throughout its qualities and each
of its qualities overlaps each of its other qualities. "It is the sourness
of the lemon which is yellow, it is the yellow which is sour." In the sense
that qualities extend throughout each other, every quality of being is all
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being. Quality exposes the absolute contingency of being, and the appre-
hension of a quality, therefore, does not add anything to being except the
fact that being is there as ’’this." ’-Quality is the whole of being reveal-
ing itself within the limits of the * there is.*’’149But in order for a
quality to be, it must be for a nothingness which is not itself a quality.
Quality, then, is revealed to the For-itself. The For-itself, by internal
negations knows (announces to itself) that which-it-is-not by means of the
quality. The quality ’’is there’’ at a distance and ’’haunts us’’ from a dis-
tance. It is a presence perpetually out of reach, and it refers us to
ourselves as to an emptiness. A quality is not some mysterious being im-
printed upon substance; it is merely the "profile’’ of being—to-be revealed—
to the For-itself as not-being-the-For-itself
.
(2) Potentiality.^0
In order to see the notion of potentiality in a clearer light, let us
here recapitulate our previous concept of internal negation. The For-itself
by applying the act of negation on any In-itself projects itself toward the
future. The "this" appears as that toward which I project, and as soon as
I apprehend it I have surpassed it. Indeed, the For-itself is non-thetic
consciousness of itself and the thetic consciousness of being. And thetic
consciousness of being implies a future dimension; that is, insofar as the
For-itself posits Being-in-itself it escapes toward the future. Even in a
mere external negation whereby I assert that at this moment a chair is not
a table, I hint at the exclusion of the future, and thereby making refer-
ence to the future dimension. In an internal negation, however, the future
dimension appears more explicitly and in several ways. Take the example
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whereby I assert that I am not this ehair. Here the ehair may be eon-
sidered as an object on which, in the more. I may or may not sit, further-
more, it possesses traits of permanence. 151And permanence always Indicates
an elementary view of the more in things, for in considering an object
as permanent, I go beyond this object toward the future. In the manner
that the ‘ or-itself regards the chair as an object for future sitting, as
a permanent object, etc., it endows the In-itself with potentiality. Still
there are other ways that potentialities may manifest themselves in the In-
itself. In the case of the crescent moon we saw how the For-itself sur-
passed the crescent moon and thereby investing in the crescent moon the
potentiality of a full moon. Thus it is by and through the For-itself
that potentialities come to the In-itself.
In regard to possibilities of the For-itself, however, since they depend
solely on the free choice of the For-itself, their contrary is always possible.
When I regard a particular In-itself from one point of view, I endow it with
one set of possibilities, and as I regard it from a different point of view,
I may endow it with a new set of possibilities. For instance, I may de-
cide to sit on this particular chair, or I may decide to reduce it to
pieces of wood and use these for firewood. Thus the possibilities of the
In-itself are nothing but the potentializing view of the For-itself.
How in the notion of the For-itself as the capacity to go beyond things,
Sartre sees the solution to the problem of abstractions . According to
Sartre abstractions as such are never given. He writes paradoxically,
"Green is never green." i"Jhat Sartre meant by this statement was simply that
the existent never possesses its essence as a present quality; instead, it
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points at it. The essence constitutes the ideal outlines of a thin*
realized in the most perfect form-it must always lie beyond consciousness,
it must be that background against which instances of this essence as mani-
fest in reality appear to consciousness. If there were such an idealistic
fonn which corresponds to the idealistic aspiration of the For-itself. it
would be found in beauty . But because the For-itself is forever insatiable
and appears as a perpetual ’’lack." this ideal must remain an absence for-
ever. It is always apprehended as "an absence revealing itself implicitly
in the imperfections of the world."1 -*2
It is appropriate at this point of our analysis of the structures of
the In-itself to emphasize that these structures (spaciality, potentiality,
permanence, essence, quality) appear to consciousness as soon as there is
consciousness. Furthermore, the In-itself reveals itself not as an indi-
vidual structure but as the totality of its structures. No singular struc-
ture has any priority over any other? they all appear at once to con-
sciousness. And there is no unifying factor in the manner of a substance
which is conceived to possess all the structures of the In-itself.
1«
(3) Instrumentality.
The notion of the -'or—itself as a ,'lack ,, has appeared again and again
in our analysis of the For-itself. Here again we must appeal to this con-
cept in order to understand the "drives*1 and "appetites" so frequently dis-
cussed in psychology. According to Sartre the notion "drives" must be
understood as the projections from the For-itself into the In-itself, projec-
tion emanating from the essential "lack" which constitutes the For-itself.
Drives are not the sort of In-itself existents whiah the psychologists tend
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to favor. On the level of the consciousness of the world, this lack can
appear only in projection, as a transcendent and ideal characteristic which
the world is not. Thus the world is revealed as haunted by absences to
be realized, and each "this'’ appears with a cortege of absences which
point to it and determine it. These absences are essentially indistin-
guishable from potentialities j however, it is easier to apprehend their
meaning. Thus, insofar as the absences determine "this" as this, the "this"
must point toward the absences, specifically, its absences. And since each
absence is an absent In-itself, it points toward other aspects of its be-
ing and toward other beings, and this series of "pointing toward" is
petrified" (fixed) in In-itself. Now then, these absences, insofar as they
urge realization and completion bring us to Sartre »s concept of task . The
In-itself, although it appears as passive indifference, it nevertheless
indicates a task which can be fulfilled. And this In-itself as it indi-
cates a task is precisely what Sartre calls a "tool." This quality of
"instrumentality" enables the transformation of objects into a "world"
which is the correlate of the nihilation which is the For-itself. The
world of tools appears as the externalized image of the possibilities of the
For-itself projected into the realm of the In-itself. Thus we have to
recognize the world as derivative from an indifferent background of Reinp-
in—itself -which becomes organized into meaning through the projections of
the For-itself as nihilation. Indeed, it is by the very act of nihilation,
whereby I affirm myself as net being this indifferent realm of Bein “-in-
itself, that I make the world meaningful as the objective correlate of etv
eternal striving I
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With these analyses Sartre feels that he has made an advance over
earlier theories, and that he is able to do justice to both idealism and
realism without falling into their error. 155With the idealists he affirms
that the Being-for-itself is genuine knowledge of Being, but he insists
that knowledge must refer to a real being. Through the For-itself the In-
itself allows itself to be affirmed. The function of the For-itself con-
Bists in part in the affirmation of In-itself through internal negations of
itself as In-itself. With the realists Sartre asserts that it is Being
itself which is present to consciousness, but he maintains that the For-
itself adds nothing to the In-itself save the affirmation that "there is"
an In-itself. And moreover, in opposition to the realists Sartre insists
that the lcnower (the For-itself) does not exist as an absolute and self-
sufficient form of being. From this we are left to wonder if Sartre is as
much of a realist as he pretends. It is evident, however, from his Being
ajjd. d^M-ngpess that Sartre consistently opposes idealism insofar as he
relegates the whole mass of being to the realm of the Being-in-itself
. But
in so doing he has emptied the Being-for-itself of all of its being. Yet
he assigns to the For-itself unlimited activities. The For-itself must
above all make that "there is" being, and it is only through the appari-
tion of the Being—for—itself that there is presence of time and space; in
short, meaning of the world is possible only through the For-itself. The
world simply It is the For-itself which through its profusive variety
of ecstasies, through its continual nihiletion and its multiform inten-
tionality, constitutes the world . The For-itself must perform all these
activities and yet it must remain an empty nothingness; herein lies the
10?
paradox.
Sartre appears, from this strict philosophical sense, to be both a
realist and an idealist, but this is but an unavoidable consequence in the
development of the fundamental characteristic of his system—that is the
tension between a Being-in-itself which has nothing to do and all to be, and
a Being-for-itself which has all to do and nothing to be. This nerpetual
opposition which emerges as a consequence of the nature of the two regions
of being is truly characteristic of Sartre* s philosophy alone.
(3) In-itself and Time. 1^
In his analysis of the temporality of the world, Sartre remains un—
waiverlngly faithful to his original conception of the two regions of being.
According to Sartre
,
the succession of time as such does not exist. The In-
itself exists "in one stretch" through past, present, and future; whereas
the temporality of the For-itself sots itself along the revealed In-itself
which appears as something identical to itself. Temporality, then, is
nothing but the measure of the permanent identity of the In-itself. It is
through time that we recognize "this" chair as "this" chair. Objects inde-
pendent of consciousness simply are , and time flows over them; it is through
consciousness that they have permanence (become temporal). S'e need not
elaborate any further on the nature of the temporality of the In-itself.
Our analysis of temporality as it pertains to the For-itself has adequately
demonstrated the one essential point that concerns us, namely, temporality
appears only with the apparition of human consciousness.
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C * The Impossibility of a Synthesis
/e have struggled our way through the long and tortuous road of the
first two parts of Sartre »s Be£n£. and Nothingness
. Our exposition was an
attempt to render Sartre’s arguments in simpler language and at the same
time without doing violence to the meaning Sartre intended to convey. How-
ever, due to the obscurity of Sartre’s essays, in many instances we were
forced to use his often fantastic terminology and hence to forsake our aim
at clarity. Indeed, every critic who has written on Sartre’s ontology, to
our knowledge, has denounced the obscurity and complexity of Sartre’s Seine
and E&frM-nflness. Now that we have provided this rather lengthy exposition
and have imposed so heavily on the reader’s patience and indulgence, what
conclusions can we offer? The question that is put to us with particular
urgency is "What is the predominant theme in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness ?”
More specifically, "What oan we conclude from our analysis of Being-for-
itself and Being-in-itself ?" To this end let us reassess the main point of
our exegesis.
In the early pages of his Introduction we can already detect Sartre’s
effort to distinguish between the being of oonseiousness and the being of the
phenomenon (transphenomenal being or Being-in-itself
,
Sartre seems to use
these terms synonymously) . Here we saw how Sartre, proceeding from a supposed
phenomenological approach, sought to establish explicitly the nature of con-
sciousness and the nature of Being-in-itself and the irreconcilable opposi-
tion between then. Consciousness for Sartre is always intentional, it always
appears in the form consciousness-of
,
that is, it is invariably object oriented.
Hence consciousness cannot exist without the object of consciousness, nor can
the object make its appearance without consciousness. Consciousness Is, more-
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over, immediate consciousness of self, which is to say. it is non-positional
consciousness of self. This is precisely the nature of consciousness as a
pre-reflective co^ to . Furthermore, eonscioxisness is the source of all nega.
lions and therefore it possesses the power to negate, or in Sartrean ter-
minology, it can perform the "nihilating withdrawal” with respect to its
objects. And since consciousness is the source of all non-being, it must
itself be a non-being, for according to Sartre, only that which is itself
a non-being can make non-being happen to things. Consoiousness
, then, is
the non-being by and through which non-being comes into the world. Insofar
as consciousness necessarily posits an object, the object must in turn re-
quire a consciousness to which it appears; and this appearing to conscious-
ness emerges as that which is other-than-consciousness, in other words, the
Being-in-itself appears as not-self. Being-in-itself is also conceived as
that which really ^s; it rests on the foundation of its own being. And
this < eing-in-itself is massive, full, dense, opaque, dumb, and brute
existent; it is gratuitous, superfluous, unjustifiable, and without reason
for being ; it is ’ de trop”; it is radically contingent, it simply is. Con-
sciousness, then, is conceived as pure non-being (empty being) but at the
same time it is pure activity; Being-in-itself, on the other hand, is ab-
solutely inactive, yet it is overflowing with being. With this radical dis-
tinction Sartre hoped to have established the basic structural differences
between the two regions of being and thereby providing the foundation for
his project, namely, to show the impossibility of an eventual synthesis of
the two regions of being, and to show that the For-itself continuously
strives for this unattainable synthesis.
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In his analysis of the different types of human conduct, Sartre again
sought to expose consciousness as the source and origin of non-being. And
fron this Sartre embarked on his venture to systematically empty the For-
itself of all being. Our examination of each of the three modes of human
conduct, namely, interrogation, apprehension of destruction, and negative
judgment, revealed to us the characteristic feature of consciousness—its
capacity to generate non-being. From this we were led to conclude that the
!• or-itoelf is its own non-being; and as we shall see later, this conclusion
is unwarranted.
The concept of bad faith once again served primarily to show how it is
that the For-itself, in its very being, is permeated with nothingness.
Consciousness, as the being permeated by nothingness and as the being from
which non-being emerges, cannot be identified with Being-in-itself
,
which,
as such, is full and massive being. The For-itself is here regarded as the
being which is not what it is and is what it is not, as the being which con-
stantly escapes identification, in contradistinction to the Being-in-itself,
which is exactly what it is and is perpetually identical to itself. Indeed,
from this perspective, then, any attempt on the part of the For-itself to
synthesize (identify or appropriate, this latter term Sartre sometimes uses
to designate the pursuit of synthesis by the For-itself) the other region
of being, namely the Being-in-itself, will ultimately lead to frustration.
We next considered the immediate structures of the For-itself; these
were impersonality, nonsubstantiality, lack and desire, and values and pos-
sibles. In his discussion of impersonality Sartre concluded that the For-
itself as the being of its own nothingness does not lend itself to any
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ecological formulation. In the section on nonsubstantiality, Sartre charac-
terized the For-itself as a nonsubstantial being in contrast to the Cartesian
"thinking substance." In the remaining two sections on the immediate struc-
tures of the For-itself Sartre explored the concepts of lack, desire, values
and possibles. These four structures, as we have seen, express the same
fundamental project, that of the For-itself in its pursuit of a synthesis.
The For-itself as lack, desire, values, and possibles cries out for com-
pletion and for identification with the Being-in-itself
. But because the
For-itself is the being of its own nothingness, this aspiration is, in
principle, unattainable and therefore must remain a perpetual yearning. It
should also be noted that the immediate structures of the For-itself are
stipulated by fundamental structure of the For-itself as Nothingness, empti-
ness and non-being. The immediate structures themselves are but an elabora-
tion of an unavoidable result of the For-itself as Nothingness.
fhe sections devoted to the explication of the notions of temporality
and reflection proved to be no less explicit in their emphasis on the radi-
cal opposition and the futility of the For-itself »s effort to appropriate
the Being-in-itself
,
be it in the mode of self-coincidence or in the mode of
identifying itself with an external In-itself
.
It must now be apparent that when we speak of the For-itself seeking
to appropriate the In-itself, attempting to capture the In-itself, in search
for self-coincidence or self-identification, we mean to express the For-
itself in its unique project of synthesizing itself with Being-in-itself.
These are but different modes of the same project. This project, however,
must not be confounded with the concept of knowledge. Knowledge is merely
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* tyPS °f r6latlon b8tw*«" Bein,-for-itsnlf and Being-ln-ita.lf, a„d as such
It cannot be understood as a synthesis.
Our discussion on the structures and temporality of the In-itself re-
vealed to us the unavoidable conclusion of Sartre »s phenomenological onto-
logy. Here, as elsewhere, we must ultimately recognize that the In-itself
in its many structures (quality, permanence, potentiality, spatiality. es-
sence, and temporality) appears as soon as and insofar as there is conscious-
ness. Consciousness is the underlying condition for the appearance of Being-
in-itself
, which invariably appears as other-than-consciousness. The haitus
created as the very consequence of the natures of the two regions of
being can never be removed, and yet these beings are perpetually interde-
pendent, each subsisting only insofar as the other subsists.
Our attempt here is aimed at establishing the following thesis, namely,
for Sartre the synthetic unity of a For-itself-in-itself is an ideal and not
realizable structure of experience, moreover his analysis of the two regions
of Being served primarily to show that such a synthetic unity would be a
flagrant contradiction. In fact the validity, consistence and significance
of his ontological system require the unresolvable dualism of the For-itself
and the In-itself. In the next few pages we hope to state our case more
forcefully by examining four fundamental structures of the For-itself: the
For—itself as a nonsubstantial being; as lack; as desire; and as Nothingness
(non-being).
(a) For-itself as a nonsubstantial being.
In our expository section devoted to the analysis of the notion of non-
substantiality, we stressed that Sartre conceived the For-itself as a non-
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substantial being in contradistinction to Descartes* “thinking substance."
Consciousness, for Sartre, requires no sustaining "substance" in order to
be. If we posit a substantial consciousness we would, by the same stroke,
introduce elements of Being-in-itself into consciousness and thereby destroy
consciousness as pure consciousness which can never exist as an autonomous
substance. A substantial predicate, then, is a priori ruled out for con-
sciousness, Sartre *s system cannot accommodate a substantial consciousness,
for in it it appears as a manifest contradiction.
If we postulate a substantial consciousness are we not, in effect, syn-
thesising the two regions of Being? An autonomous and substantial con-
sciousness would participate in the realm of the For-itself as well as in
the realm of the In-itself. In suoh an ideal construction the For-itself
would appropriate the 'Being-in-itself in the heart of its own being. Hence
if this construction were possible in real experience, then we would have
realized the ideal synthetic unity in reality. But, as we have already seen,
Sartre argues that this is not possible. It would appear, then, by this
manner of argumentation Sartre sought to expose the untenability of such a
postulation in his system. Indeed, by exposing the contradictions entailed
in such a synthesis, Sartre strove to render the unresolvable dualism of
the For-itself and the In-itself.
(b) For-itself as Lack.
The For-itself as a lack seems to suggest that it is, in some sense,
incomplete. And insofar as the For-itself is incomplete it seeks and points
at its fulfillment . According to Sartre what the For-itself laoks is being,
more explicitly Being-in-itself. Thus if the For-itself is to be fulfilled
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it must appropriate iieing-in-ltself In a aynthetle totality. Such an
appropriation, however, is none other than the syntheais of the two regions
of 3einB . Rut. in Sartre's view, the For-itself is a perpetual lack whioh
can never be fulfilled or completed, hence, the For-itself must remain a
lack for eternity.
The For-itself as a lack points at its fulfillment
, which is to say, it
projects towards the For-itself-in-itself
. And so lone as the For-itself
remains a lack its projection is but an ideal projection, and the ideal Be-
ing (For-itself-in-itself) is that whioh the For-itself continually strives
for yet never realizes. What Sartre proposed to do by his analysis of the
For-itself as a lack of Being-in-itself
,
then, was to show that the unifi-
cation of the opposing realms of Being is not possible.
(o) For-itself as Desire.
The i or-itself as desire like the For-itself as lack, expresses a funda-
mental incompleteness. The For-itself as desire, Sartre tells us, is the con-
tinuous desire to be assimilated with Being-in-itself in a synthetic unity,
and this synthetic unity constitutes that very being (For-itself-in-itself)
which is, in principle, unattainable. Sartre rejects the notion of desire
as a psychic state, for all psychic states exist in the mode of being which
is exactly that it is, namely, in the mode of Being-in-itself. But Being-
in-itself is all positivity and therefore complete and fulfilled. And a
fulfilled desire is no longer a desire. The For-itself as a continuous desire
demands that it remain forever unfulfilled and incomplete. Then if we charac-
terize the Being-for-itself as a perpetual desire we must thex*eby conclude
that the For-itself can never be fulfilled and hence never be assimilated
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with the Being-in-itself, Here as in the previous sections Sartre has
guided us to the same conclusion#
(d) For-itself as Nothingness#
Our final illustration pertains to that structure of the Being-for-
itself which embraces all of the above three examples. The For-itself as
nothingness is the very condition which makes the For-itself as lack, as
desire and as a nonsubstantial being possible. These three characteristics
of the T or-itself participate in the fundamental structure of the For-
itself; they are but the expressions of the For-itself as Nothingness. The
For-itself as Nothingness, then, appears as the structure from which all its
other structures are derived.
Sartre devoted lengthy sections to substantiate his claim that the For-
itself, in its innermost being, is a non-being. His discussion of the origin
of negations,of the concept of Nothingness, of bad faith, of the immediate
structures of the Being-for-itself
,
of temporality and in a negative sense
even his discussion of the nature of the Being-in-itself were designed to
demonstrate the inescapable emptiness of the For-itself. If for the present
we grant Sartre this dubious claim (we shall challenge this claim in our
criticism) we must conclude with Sartre, that the For-itself as the being
whose most oharaoteristio feature is its Nothingness can never appropriate
the Being-in-itself. In other words the For-itself and the In-itself because
of their contradictory natures, can never exist harmoneously in the unity of
a synthetic whole. And this is precisely to say that a synthesis between the
two regions of Being can never be achieved. We ought, then, in Sartre* s view,
regard the appropriation of In-itself by the For-itself as an unattainable
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ideal.
Appropriation, then, must remain forever a symbolic yet impossible
ideal—the For-itself-in-itself • This basic dualism can never be resolved.
Ihe ror-itself, as it aspires to be its own foundation, seeks the status of
7or-itself-in-itself
; it seeks to be the Absolute—in short, to be God.
For God, according to Sartre, is precisely this synthesis—the For-itself-
in-itself. From this, then, Sartre writes: "One can say that what renders
the fundamental project of the human reality most conceivable is that being
who projects himself to be God,"157To be mRn, then, is the fundamental desire
to be God. Hence, the dialectical relationships between the For-itself and
the In-itself must be understood as this failure to achieve synthesis. From
this the reader may wonder why Sartre seeks to establish an ultimate reso-
lution of the dualism in the "synthetic liaison." In this regard he writes
"the For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic liaison which
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is not other than the For-itself itself." This union, however, must be
understood in regard to the genesis of the dualism. By this union Sartre
I59
merely sought to answer the question "How did the duality arise?" The For-
itself does not have any autonomous substance to which the In-itself may be
synthesized—it has only its Nothingness—and hence, the ideal project is
doomed to failure from the start.
In his Conclusion Sartre makes a final attempt to reconcile the two
polarities of Being in an ideal synthesis of Being. Here Sartre explains that
our previous analysis has shown that understanding of the For-itself pre-
supposes the immediate acknowledgment and consideration of the In-itself,
and vice versa. And unless an intimate relation exists between them, they would
be mere abstractions.
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'The In-itself and the For-itself are not juxtaposed. Quite
to the contrary, the For-itself without the In-itself is
something like an abstraction. It could no more exist than
a color without form or a sound without highness and without
timbre; a consciousness which would be consciousness of noth—
ing -would be an absolute nothing ( nihilum absolutism) , "T60
The T’or-itself insofar as it is consciousness (of) the In-itself must
point to this internal relation which constitutes for Sartre the essence of
the bond unifying the In-itself and the For-itself.
”If consciousness is linked to the In-itself by an internal
relation, does that net signify that it is articulated with
it in order to constitute a totality and is it not to this
that the name of being or of reality refers? Undoubtedly,
the For-itself is nihilation, but, by virtue of nihilation,
it is; and it is in a priori unity with the In-itself."*°1
However, despite the fact that this internal relation does provide us a
concept of Being which is a synthetic totality, we are still left with the
dualism as it appears in the existent, which is a For-itself in relation to
an In-itself.
MIf we have to consider the total being as constituted by
the synthetic organization of the In-itself and the For-
itself, are we not going to find again the difficulty which
w© wish to avoid? Are we not going to encounter again in the
existent itself the hiatus which we discerned in the con-
cept of being ?»162
Thus Sartre seems to suggest here that the ideal synthesis of Being is
an impossible and self-aontradictory structure, but, nevertheless, if it
should exist, we would Ienow its structure.
The impossibility of a synthesis is the necessary conclusion from the
development of Sartre* s system, and as such we must accept it. The problem
seems to reside in the Introduction of Sartre* s Hein? and Nothingness . Here
Sartre introduces a few postulates that are not derivable from a phenomeno-
logical basis, and from these he develops an entire ontology. He charac-
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terizes the Being-for-itself as empty of being but. nevertheless, demands
of it a vast profusion of activities. On the other hand, the Being-in-
itself is regarded as full and massive being, whose only function is to be
exactly what it is. In our next and final chapter we shall concern ourselves
with evaluating Sartre’s phenomenological method, some of his postulates,
and some weaknesses in Sartre’s conception of the Being-for-itself
.
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PART IV
CRITICISMS
In his Introduction Sartre announced his project as a "phenomenologi-
cal ontology." In our critical evaluation we must determine to what extent
Sartre • s approach is phenomenological in the strict Husserlian sense. It
vas in anticipation of this comparison that we provided a resume' of Husserl's
method. In these following pages we shall show that, in fact, Sartre has
deviated substantially from Husserl's phenomenological method, despite the
fact that he has characterized his inquiry as "phenomenological."
The entire "phenomenological" basis of Being and Nothingness is to be
found in the Introduction where Sartre developed the idea of phenomena, the
Being of phenomena, the phenomena of Being, and the pre-reflective cocito .
His purpose here, as we have mentioned earlier, is first to formulate in some
detail the problem of Being; and secondly to establish the initial distinc-
tion between the two legions of Being. Since his primary concern is to find
a solution for the problem of Being by means of phenomenological ontology,
Sartre began with a discussion of the phenomena of Being and the Being of
phenomena. And his consideration of the pre-reflective cogito and of con-
sciousness as opposed to the Being-in—itself was meant to serve as a prelimi-
nary introduction for an eventual establishment of this fundamental dualism.
We must now ask: "Is the analysis of the structures of the two regions of
Being derive 1 from a purely phenomenological basis?"
To begin with, in his analysis of Being, Sartre rejects both the tech-
niques of epoche and reductions, for as a realist Sartre cannot leave this
problem of existence suspended or "bracketed out." In fact, Sartre holds that
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the Husserlian reductions are not the proper method to begin the analysis 0f
being. In his analysis of consciousness Sartre borrows Husserl* s notion
of ,,intentionality,’,l63but he argues that Husserl's theory of intention-
ality lends itself to two interpretations: “Either we understand by this
that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object, or else it
signifies that consciousness in its most profound nature is in rapport
with a transcendental being."^As we have seen Sartre adopts the latter in-
terpretation and claims that Husserl's theory, in its first interpretation,
leads ultimately to a transcendental idealism which would make reality sub-
jectively created and unreal.10taking Husserl's notion of intentionality as
his point of departure, Sartre develops his own peculiar "ontological proof"
of transcendent being. He writes: "Consciousness is consciousness of
something: This signifies that transcendence is the constitutive structure
of consciousness, i.e., consciousness originated carried in a being which is
not it. It is this which we call the ontological proof And "To say that
consciousness is consciousness o£ something signifies that for consciousness
there is no being outside this precise obligation to be a revealing intui-
tion of something, i.e., a transcendent being;... for a revealing intuition
implies a revealed. Absolute subjectivity can only be constituted in the
face of a revealed; immanence can be defined only in the seizure of a trans-
cendent. nl ^
Whatever other merits such a form of argumentation may have, it is
clearly not phenomenological in the rigid Husserlian sense. There has been
no reduction, and consequently the examined content of subjectivity remains
impure, contaminated by the "natural attitude." If Sartre has not remained
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faithful to the Russarli&n phenomenological method, how may we characterize
his method? On this account Eatanson writes: "The nature of Sartre *s
method may be characterized as qussi-phenomenological and intuitive ...
Sartre does not use the term "intuition" in the Kantian sense of Anschauung
but rather in the sense of felt necessity which accompanies an inspiration
of such experiences as ‘revealed* ontological truth, which is the heart of
oartre*s method. In contrast to hypothetico-deduetive types of philosophies,
revealed ontology is an exploitation of the subject-pole of experience; in
contrast to liusserlian phenomenology, ontological revelation does not begin
with a formal epochs and does not have a precise methodology.
Ihus Sartre, attending to the demands of realism, went beyond phenomenon
to postulate a massive Being-in-itself . Starting from the phenomenon and
the notion of intent! onality, he concluded that Being-in-itself is. By ascrib-
ing this ontological status to the objects of consciousness, Sartre has gone
far beyond Husserl, who confined himself to a coherent systemization of
phenomena. It is understandable why Sartre, who claims to be a realist of
sorts, must somehow arrive at the existence of concrete and massive being;
however, it seems somewhat audacious to begin with the phenomenon and hope
to arrive at concrete being. If we recall, phenomenology purports merely to
describe that which appears, yet Sartre assures us that the Being-in-itself
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"overflows" its appearance. One wonders, as a phenomenologist, how he knows
this. His notion of "transphenomenality" expresses this same idea.
In this connection Roger Troifontaines writes in his le Ghojx de Jean-
Paul Sartre:
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"The phenomenon from which one starts manifests itself at
once as a relation between two transphenomenal beines; con-
sciousness on the one hand and the objective condition of
ai^B!rfeS^^°n °n the other * Is on« consistent then,with the method of phenomenology, when one asserts that abeing which appears only in relation to consciousness is
non-relative to consciousness? Granted that relation as
a term implies a degree of autonomy that belongs to the
eing-ir-itself
,
yet is it not a palpable extrapolation to
make it into an absolute and to cut it from all* relations?
Is it not yet another equally obvious extrapolation to de-
clare it non-consclous, inert, massive , simply because itis other than consciousness?.,. The question comes down
to this : by what right does one place beyond all relation
an In-itself which is known only through a relation?«*7®
On this point Gabriel Marcel makes the following comment:
11
Ihere is reason to believe that the source of the contradic-
tion is to be found in the unclear introduction to the work
Nothingness ) . This source seems to me to lie in
what H. Sartre in a dangerously ambiguous phrase, designates
as 'the transphenoraenality of being. 1 Contrary to what might
be expected this word in no way refers to anything that resem-
bles Kant's Djng-an
-slch ( thing-in-itself ). The transphenomenal
being of phenomena is the being of this table, of this pack of
tobacco, of the lamp, and more generally the being of the world
implied by consciousness. What consciousness requires is sim-
ply that the being of that which appears should not exist solely
insofar as it appears ... It is difficult to see how the trans-
phenomenality of being could be anything but a figment invented
by a mode of thinking which has not yet fully succeeded in un-
folding its own meaning. ”^-71
likewise C. E. Magny questions:
’’Upon what do the initial analyses rest, what is our guarantee
for their validity? >iust they be taken as postulate or as grounds
of evidence, or how else?”^-^
Desan in his The Tragic vinale remarks
:
’’Sartre's proof of the existence and massiveness of Being-in
itself is certainly not apodictic ... My own opinion is that
this initial start is not a fora of evidence but is something
far more like a postulate .”1^
Indeed it seems that Sartre has relied on what Natanson calls an ’’intui-
tion. ’’^^It is clear that with this attempt Sartre hoped to have avoided
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idealism and ultimately solipsism. But to depart from a phenomenological
basis, as Sartre did, irreconeiliable contradictions become inevitable.
Sartre »s entire exploration of the Being-for-itself is partially aimed
at sustaining this postulate. For if Sartre can succeed in showing that
the For-itself is truly empty of all being, then it follows that if there
is being it must neoessarily be found in the realm of Being-in-itself since
these are the only two regions of Being Sartre admits. Hence, we must now
determine how successful Sartre has been in his attempt to sustain his views
that non-being resides in the For-itself—which is itself a non-being—and
that this I or-itself is impersonal and nonsubstantial.
-artre begins with the discussion of three types of human conduct:
interrogation, apprehension of destruction, and negative judgment. And with
each notion Sartre introduces non-being under one form or another. From the
notion of interrogation, Sartre concluded that every interrogation presup-
poses an ignorance (absence of knowledge) on the part of the one who questions,
and this absence of knowledge is a form of non-being which is incarnated in
consciousness itself. Can we allow this? If we accept the term "non-
being” to imply the idea of Motherness/’^^than clearly we cannot accept
Sartre* s conclusion. But if we understand non-being to mean non-existence or
17
non-existent; or absence, privation, lack or negation of existence or existent,
then Sartre's conclusion does not appear to be a blatant sophism after all,
since this is precisely Sartre's characterization of non-being. And if we
embrace the existential definition of non-being: "ton-being is the source
v n
of negation"; f :,Non-being is the complete negation of the totality of what
173
is," then we must concede to Sartre that absence (negation) of knowledge
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does in fact imply a non-being which emerges from consciousness. Likewise,
if we admit that negative judgment is a form of non-being, then we must ul-
timately recognize that non-being emerges from the human consciousness. With
the concept of destruction Sartre sought to illustrate the same point, namely,
©very instance of an apprehension of destruction a form of non-being is intro-
duced. Since the apprehension of destruction presupposes the acknowledgment
or recognition of a state of affairs prior to destruction, which is no longer
and hence the appearance of a for® of non-being, in human consciousness,
Sartre concluded that with every instance of destruction a non-being is
thereby introduced. And since only human consciousness can apprehend de-
struction and that state of affairs which no longer exists, it follovs, for
^artre, that consciousness is the being by and through which non-being emerge.
Ibis assertion does not pose any difficulty, our question is how does Sartre
justify his claim that the being from which non-being emerges must itself be
a non-being. The problem for Sartre, then, is to justify his identification
of this non-being as human consciousness. Sartre claims that "that by which
non-being comes into the world, must be its own non-being
*
M
^^hence con-
sciousness must itself be a non-being from which other non-beings emerge.
Again he argues: "The Being by which Non-being arrives in the world must
nihilate Non-Being in its Being, and even so it still runs the risk of
establishing Non-being as a transcendent (absence of being) in the very heart
of immanence (presence of being) unless it nihilates Non-being in its being
1 ftft
in connection with its own beim • n "The Being by which Non-being comes to
181 ,
the world must be its own Non-being." ' Sartre seems to be arguing that only
"what-is-not-Being-in-itself" is able to apprehend "what-is-Being-in-itself ,"
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and because Being-in-itself is full, impregnable, and massive being, non-
being cannot reside in Being-in-itself. Thus, insofar as we can conceive
of non-being, it must be located in consciousness. And since non-being can
only emerge from that which is itself non-being, it follows, then, con-
sciousness must be its own non-being. Our problem is reduced to this:
'v^an we accept Sartre’s claim that * non—being can emerge only from that
which is itself a non-being 1 ?" Let us consider this problem.
1 we cannot say of non-being that it is . for it does not possess
that ontological status which is characteristic only of being, therefore,
we cannot conceive of it as an autonomous existent in the manner Sartre does.
We can speak of non-being only as a concept which emerges from consciousness.
And because the human consciousness is (or has) a faculty which is able to
compare, to divide, to abstract, to construct and reconstruct, to penetrate
the past, to foresee the future, to view its possibles, and so on, it can
formulate the concept of non-being. If consciousness were indeed a non-
being, one wonders how it is possible for such a consciousness to perform
the numerous activities assigned to it. An active non-being is a manifest
absurdity.
Secondly, the concept of non-being clearly has some ontological status,
such that we can say that it is without violating the fiat of reason. Hence,
we can conceive of non-being in the manner of a concept, which posits a
consciousness which nevertheless is not itself a non-being. Sartre's iden-
tification of consciousness and non-being would then appear to be a super-
fluous postulate. Here, as in the case of the transphenomenal being, Sartre
has essentially relied on an "intuition" rather than rigorous and systematic
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phenomenological analysis to which he avowed fidelity. In his exploration
of the notion of bad faith Sartre sought to establish the For-itself as a
being which can direct its negations toward itself, that is, it recognizes
itself as a being which is not what it is and is what it is not, a being
which continually escapes block identity, eoncretization, statufication
,
permanence and so on. And with this Sartre hoped to have, more forcefully,
established the lor-itself as a being which is permeated with nothingness;
a being which is in its innermost being, a non-being. Can we allow this
conclusion? If we accept Sartre *s characterization of the For-itself as a
being which continually escapes block identity, eoncretization, statufiea-
tion, etc. can we infer from this a being which is permeated with nothing-
ness? In his discussion of bad faith Sartre speaks of ”mv deceiving m^-
awakening to cynicism" ; "m£ playing to be something other than
myself 1 ’ : and so on. In this context what could Sartre be referring to if
I am nothing? That the For-itself continually escapes block identity, con-
cretization, permanency, statufication and ultimately all enclosed defini-
tion is due to the continuous flux of experiences which enriches it and to
which it is assimilated, and not, as Sartre asserts, because it is a non-
being in its innermost being. Hence, Sartre* s arguments on this point are
untenable
.
Our discussion on the notion of "intentionality" led us to conclude that
for Sartre consciousness must always be consciousness of something. Moreover,
consciousness must be essentially different from the object of consciousness.
And since the object of consciousness is none other than the Being-in-itself
,
which as such is full and massive being, Sartre concluded that consciousness
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must be in the node of non-being. Granted consciousness as that which is
other than Being-in-itself must be nonsubstantia1 and different from the
objects of consciousness, but it does not follow from this that it is itself
a non-being in the sense of not being a real entity. It would have been far
more plausible to postulate a being of consciousness whose being is essen-
tially different from the Being-in-itself (which appears as the object of
consciousness
) yet nevertheless receives from the Being-in-itself intelli-
gible determinations in a non-material way. In this manner it would have
eliminated the necessity for postulating a non-being manifesting an intrin-
sic essential structure of consciousness. This, however, is not possible
for Sartre, such a postulation would disrupt the consistency of his system.
or - artre, that the For-itself is a non-being in the heart of its being is
a necessary consequence of the For-itself as a nonsubstantial being; for
us, however, this does not follow. Nor does the power to negate or nihilate,
which according to Sartre is inherent in every consciousness, require it to
be, in its innermost being, a non-being. On the contrary, the capacity to
to negate demands that consciousness be a real existing human consciousness,
for to negate is to think, and to think requires nothing short of a being
which in some sense is . We must ultimately recognize that "being" is an
all-inclusive term, and it does not lend itself to the sort of abstractions
of which one might conceive in terms such as "mineral," "animal," or "ra-
tional# H /e must conclude, then, that consciousness is not its own non-
being. If human consciousness is not itself a non-being, then what sort
of "being" is it? This question leads us to our next point of discussion;
we must now consider Sartre* s denial of any egological structure of con-
12P
sciousness.
V/e have seen how Sartre has asserted, with unwnivering consistency,
that consciousness is a nonentity (not a real being) and that it is merely
a series of functions, which as such are but a continual negation. It is
through "internal negations" that the external world is made to appear; as
negation, then, the For-itself is nothing but the revelation of Being-in-
itself, horeovor, this possibility to negate requires as its absolute pre-
requisite an internal void in consciousness. Non-being, in fact, is the
condition of all negative judgments, interrogations, lcnowledge and so on.
As the For-itself is present to something, it is a continual nihilation
(A6afl*4sation) . Consciousness as a non-being cannot sustain the existence
of a permanent and underlying entity. The apprehension of a feeling of
personal identity through time, 'artre claims, is but the "transversal"
and "intentional" activity of the For-itself which succeeds in transmitting
to the present concrete and real remembrances of the past. Sartre, then,
denies the existence of an Ego in consciousness.
In rejecting the Ego or the permanent Self, Sartre stands in opposition
to both Descartes and Kant. Descartes, in formulating his " Corrito ergo sum ."
departed from the reflexive corrito . and thus established the Self ac a
thinking self. Hence the supposition of an "Ego" in the center of our think-
ing is explicit. Kant, too, in his transcendental theory considered the
self to be an inscrutable subject presupposed by the unity of empirical self-
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consciousness. Moreover, by repudiating the Ego Sartre sets himself against
Husserl. Indeed, Husserl’s systematic phenomenology is essentially a descrip-
tion of the cogitatum as it appears to the %o which is regarded as the
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unifying element. Husserl in this connection, asserts: "The :zo stun
must be considered apodictic.
-artre, then, rejects all egological formulations for consciousness;
however, as we shall subsequently show, he is not consistent in maintaining
this position, and, moreover, there are disadvantages to such a position.
i‘irst, Varet has cogently captured this point in his L'Ontologie de
: :g£fr.re ; -artre acknowledges the distinction between authentic reflection anct^'
186£r£rr?flectj.ye c^^to. J We have seen that in authentic reflection conscious-
ness explicitly and clearly reflects on itself and posits itself; that is,
in every act of cognition, I know that I know something. Hence, in any act
of authentic reflection, I encounter and posit the Ego; for here knowledge
appears as nj£ knowledge of myself as the being who knows. And because
Sartre cannot escape the presence of the %o in authentic reflection, he
deviously sought to avoid this problem by developing his entire ontology by
means of the pre-reflective cogito . By utilizing the concept of pre-reflectivo
cogjto instead of authentic reflection, Sartre would have bypassed the prob-
lem of the dyadic reflecting-reflected; and hence, he need not posit a
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scissiparity in consciousness. But by the mere fact that Sartre recog-
nized the notion of authentic reflection, he has engendered in consciousness
a scissiparity—the encounter with the Ego is, therefore, unavoidable. Cn
this point there is an obvious lack of consistency on the part of Sartre.
Secondly, the resolute conviction with which I assert that I_ am does
not seeem to give wav even in face of the subtlety of Sartrean dialectic.
Although, strictly speaking, it is virtually impossible to prove such an
assertion, it is at least as certain, if not more so than, Sartre* s 'Intui-
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tions." Sartre would probably argue that consciousness is nothin? but
‘•revelation of • “laok of . ..,“ “desire for ...," Eeing-in-itself
; it
itself is Nothingness. However, it is apparent that “revelation of ... “
“lack of ...,“ and other such relations presuppose an inescapable terminus
a guo and ad guem which is none other than the Ego who negates, desires,
lacks, and so on. Sartre has characterized the For-itself as a permanent
lack of Being-in—itself and a permanent desire to appropriate Bein?r-in-
itself
. The For-itself as a lack of Being-in-itself admittedly manifests a
form of being essentially different from Being-in-itself
, but by this verv
fact we must conceive of it as a being rather than a non-being. In like
manner the For-itself as desire for Beinsr-in-itself expresses the idea of one
form of being which desires another form of being; in short we must postu-
late both the being that desires and the being that is desired.
Thirdly, by the very fact that exteriority delimits and specifies
consciousness, consciousness must exercise the acts of awareness. For in-
stance, in the notion of “spatiality,” Sartre may be right when he asserts
that the notion of space is meaningless apart from a human consciousness
which realizes “this” as external to “that.” But it is only because con-
sciousness is a permanent Center that it can effect a unification of the
external objects in a spatial relation. And also the feeling of personal
identity in the temporal unity of past and present cannot be adequately
explained without positing a Subject who is able to unify past and present.
This feeling of personal identity is nothing but the expression of perma-
nence in consciousness, and a non-being could hardly possess any sort of
permanence or identity. It is difficult to understand how Sartre could, on
131
the one hand, accept the existence of a past for the For-itself f
W
yet. on
the other hand, reject permanence in consciousness. With these comments,
then, can we still be satisfied with Sartre's empty and impersonal For-
itself devoid of all being? Sartre's repudiation of the Ego does not seem
to be apodictic. Nor is his characterization of the For-itself as having
*11 do and nothing to be convincing.
Throughout Sartre's Being and Nothingness he speaks of "my possible."
'my desire," "my past," and so on. One wonders how he can refer to the I
in this manner if I an nothfo.g. Furthermore, in the entire section devoted
to the concept of "bad faith," Sartre exploits the ontological dualism of
the 2. and the Other , and he also defines bad faith as an act wherein I
hide the truth from myself . It would appear that Sartre has failed in his
project to empty the ?or-itself of all being, and that the For-itself is
not as empty and impersonal as Sartre would have us believe.
If our exegesis has succeeded in showing that Sartre's efforts were
devoted to placing the whole ontological mass on the side of Being-in-
itself and concomitantly extracting from Being-for-itself all being, only
to demonstrate that ultimately a synthesis between the Being-for-itself and
the Being-in-itself is impossible, then we must conclude that Sartre has
failed. For we cannot accept Sartre's characterization of Being-for-
itself, and nor can we allow Sartre to affirm by means of an intuitive pos-
tulate the existence of the transphenomenal being* Sartre's conception of
Being, although unique in the history of philosophy, has not been adequately
substantiated. From these conclusions, then, Sartre's idea of the impossible
synthesis has no meaning for us. Sartre may be correct when he affirms that
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an ultimate synthesis between the two regions of Being is impossible, and
indeed it would be an insurmountable task to attempt to resolve the
Subject-Object dualism by means of a reconciliation of the two polarities
of Being; however, Sartre with his analysis of Being has not succeeded
in showing that such a synthesis is unattainable. Although Sartre has
failed in his original project he has succeeded in showing the limits of
phenomenology. He has shown that phenomenology as a philosoohical disci-
pline is incompatible with realism, and that as a purely descriptive method
it may occasionally lose itself in the subjectivity of the philosopher who
applies this method, Jrora Sartre’s failure it becomes apparent to us that
phenomenology is not the only approach to the solution of the problem of
Being and therefore the problem of consciousness.
i'ifinv philosophers have attempted to solve the problem of Being from a
phenomenological basis, among them are Jasners, Heidegger, and Sartre, and
each one of them arrived at a different conclusion. This should indicate
to us that phenomenology does not prescribe a definitive conclusion, and
that the theories and conclusion obtained from a phenomenological basis
depend primarily on the disposition of the individual philosopher.
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